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PROP UP THE HEAVENLY CHORUS? LABOR UNIONS, TAX
POLICY, AND POLITICAL VOICE EQUALITY
PHILIP T. HACKNEY†
“The function of democracy has been to provide the public with a second
power system, which is an alternative power system, which can be used
to counterbalance the economic power.”
E.E. Schattschneider

INTRODUCTION
Labor unions are weak politically and continue to decline in number
and political power in the United States.1 Many contend that this is a
positive development for the country because they believe labor unions
cause economic harm. 2 Others see this loss as unfortunate and harmful
because the decline of labor comes with a reduction in working class
benefits and opportunities, and also because it exacerbates economic
inequality.3 These forces battle over policies focused on the ease of union
organization and maintenance such as right to work laws and union

† James E. & Betty M. Phillips Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law Center. J.D.
LSU Law Center, LLM, New York University School of Law. A big thanks to the LSU Law Center for
a grant making this work possible, and to my research assistant Vivian A. Jeansonne. I also thank
the participants in the 2016 Junior Tax Law Conference, the participants of the 2016 Critical Tax
Law Conference, the participants of the 2016 Law & Society Conference, the students and
faculty at the Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law Advanced Topics in Tax Policy
Colloquium of Fall 2016, and the students and faculty of University California Irvine School of
Law Current Issues in Tax Policy and Law Colloquium. I especially thank Alice Abreu, Pippa
Browde, Neil Buchanan, David Cameron, Adam Chodorow, Charlotte Crane, David Elkins, Lilian
Faulhaber, Jon Forman, Daniel Hemel, Sarah Lawsky, Francine Lipman, Omri Marian, Goldburn
Maynard, Philip Postlewaite, Emily Satterthwaite, Erin Scharff, Walter Schwidetsky, and Manoj
Viswanathan for their thoughts on earlier versions of this paper.
1 Carl Becker, The Pattern of Union Decline, Economic and Political Consequences, and the
Puzzle of a Legislative Response, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1637, 1368, 1641 (2014); PHILIP YALE NICHOLSON,
LABOR’S STORY IN THE UNITED STATES ch. 9–10 (2004) (anecdotally detailing the declining power of
unions from 1968–2004); KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN ET AL., THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS 87–94 (2012).
2 MORGAN O. REYNOLDS, MAKING AMERICA POORER 187–88 (1987); F.A. Hayek, Unions,
Inflation, and Profits in STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND ECONOMICS 281 (1967).
3 Jordan Brennan, United States Income Inequality: The Concept of Countervailing Power
Revisited, 39 J. POST KEYNSIAN ECON. 72, 72–73 (2016).
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shops.4 While these are important policies for labor union power, 5 this
Article examines labor union tax treatment instead. The Article focuses
primarily on whether we should grant exemption from federal income tax
to these interest groups, but also considers whether labor union members
should be allowed to deduct labor union dues. In evaluating these
questions, this Article focuses on the value of groups in our democracy in
a social choice function model, rather than on the economic benefits of
labor unions in a social welfare function model. 6 A review of labor union
tax treatment suggests that we systematically undermine the important
voice of labor in our democracy. This Article proposes some changes to
tax policy related to labor unions as a result of this review.
In this Article I consider two somewhat divergent income tax policies:
the tax treatment of labor union income and the deductibility of labor
union dues. The first raises the issue of whether we should tax the
economic activity of a particular legal business entity. The second raises
the issue of whether certain individual expenditures should offset income
for tax purposes. Both issues raise, as a primary matter, whether the
expenditures or income represent “real income.” I argue labor union
revenue is real income, and that therefore its exemption should be
justified by some policy goal.7 In other words, there is nothing special
about the income earned by labor unions that makes it entitled on its face
to exemption from income tax. Conversely, because labor union member
dues payments represent an amount that reduces income of the labor
union member, we should allow the deduction in the ordinary course of
business unless there is a legitimate reason for not allowing that
deduction.8

4

See CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL EQUALITY: AN ESSAY IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY, 2021 (1989) (discussing the different possible constructions someone might mean by political
equality with one focused on maximizing a social welfare function and another primary
theory focused on maximizing a social choice function).
5 Patrick Flavin & Michael T. Hartney, When Government Subsidizes Its Own: Collective
Bargaining Laws as Agents of Political Mobilization, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 896, 896 (2015).
6 See CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL EQUALITY: AN ESSAY IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY 20–21 (1989)
(discussing the different possible constructions someone might mean by political equality, with
one focused on maximizing a social welfare function, and another primary theory focused on
maximizing a social choice function).
7 Philip T. Hackney, What We Talk About When We Talk About Tax Exemption, 33 VA. TAX
REV. 101 (2013) (argued all mutual benefit organizations, such as labor unions, should be
presumed to be taxable unless there is a strong policy reason for subsidizing the activity).
8 Although labor union dues are generally considered a deductible trade or business
expense under 26 U.S.C. § 162 of the Code, because labor union members are employees they
are typically unable to deduct labor union dues either as an above the line deduction under 26
U.S.C. § 62, or as an itemized deduction under 26 U.S.C. § 67; instead they generally may only
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In evaluating these two policies, I adopt a social choice function
model. Under this model we should maximize the number of individuals
who have an opportunity to express their voice to influence our
democracy. As a very simple incomplete example, if there were 100
people in a particular democracy and we said that only 25 had the ability
to influence the final decisions, a policy that increased that number of
individuals to 30 would improve the social choice function. The
incompleteness of the example is the question of the quality of the voice.
If the new 5 who are now speaking are only reiterating the voice of the 25
already speaking, then there is no real enhancement to social choice
function. In this Article, I struggle to assess when social choice function is
enhanced by this policy, but do my best to suggest a way through the
problem with the limited information at our disposal.
Importantly, the influence at issue in political voice is more than an
opportunity to vote for representatives; it includes the opportunity to
engage in policy discussions and influence final decisions on governmental
policy. As I will develop in the Article, in a large modern democracy, a
polyarchy, the primary means of obtaining that voice for most citizens is
through interest groups. As an initial matter, the government should be
hesitant to directly enhance one political interest over another; however,
because it is in our democratic interest to attempt to alleviate political
voice inequality, where we can identify a group that suffers from a
particularly weak political voice we could consider enhancing that political
voice through public policy.
When viewed through this model, it is hard to accept that current
policy regarding the deductibility of union dues is justifiable. Under the
tax law, an employee can only deduct unreimbursed business expenses to
the extent they exceed two percent of her adjusted gross income. Labor
union dues are considered unreimbursed employee business expense. As
such, labor union memers are rarely able to deduct them. A business
owner faces no such challenge in deducting his own association dues.9
These payments of dues directly impact the political voice of a labor union
member and that of the businessman. We systematically prioritize that of
the businessmans political voice and undercut the laborer’s. Given the
political voice power differential between these two classic interests in
deduct these expenses as miscellaneous itemized deductions only to the extent those amounts
exceed two percent of the members adjusted gross income.
9 Some have objected that this is a much broader problem. We widely make it difficult for
all employees to deduct unreimbursed employee business expenses. The fact that labor union
members are unable to deduct their dues is simply a narrow instance of this problem. I argue
later in the Article that the labor union case is more significant because of its direct impact on
political voice. In other employee business expense cases, this issue is not close to the fore.
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favor of the businessmans, it is hard to justify making that power
differential worse through the tax system. In order to improve the social
choice function, we should at the least make the two deductions
equivalent. In order to work towards improving the social choice function
more, we might even choose to deny the deduction to the businessman
(and maybe even others with an already substantial political voice), while
ensuring it to the labor union member.
Some have objected that the question of the labor union dues
deduction is a much broader problem. The claim is that we widely make it
difficult for employees to deduct unreimbursed employee business
expenses. The fact that labor union members are unable to deduct dues is
simply a narrow instance of this larger issue. But, the labor union case is
more significant because of its direct impact on political voice. In other
employee business expense cases, this issue is not close to the fore.
The case of tax exemption for labor unions is more complex. It
depends on other policy choices made. For instance, if other interest
groups are provided tax exemption—the status quo right now—then the
case for labor union tax exemption is overwhelming. It is only fair to
extend the exemption to labor interests if business interests benefit from
the policy. Denying labor exemption would decrease the social choice
function by reducing the voice of labor in a relative sense compared to
other political voices that the policy would enhance, such as that of
business.
However, if we compare exemption for all interest groups to a policy
state where all interests are taxed, we may find that labor interests are
better off under the latter state. The problem of collective action makes it
more difficult for large, relatively poor, and less skilled interests like labor
to form, as compared to smaller, wealthier, more skilled interests, like
those that form in the business context. In other words, exemption as a
benefit is much more likely to be of assistance to business interests in any
case than labor interests. Many business interests are simply getting a
windfall from this exemption from tax. Taxation is likely to be more of a
hindrance to the better capitalized business interests. Based on this, I
argue the social choice function would be increased under this taxable
state because labor interests, as a relative matter, would not experience
the same type of reduction in voice as would other more powerful
interests who would now have to pay tax on income.
Finally, the collective action challenge of labor in theory and practice
is so severe that a policy of tax exemption for labor interests alone could
be justified as a modest attempt at righting political voice equality in our
democracy. In a social choice function sense, providing a subsidy to labor

MPP_HACKNEY

200x]

11/9/2017 5:46 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

105

interests, while not providing the subsidy to others like business interests
could bring more voices into the political debate. However, as will be
developed below, the case for this is not strong. The policy instrument
provides meager support and is not well-tailored to accomplish this
purpose.
Our current tax-exemption system10 generally allows any group that
wants to form a non-profit organization to form and obtain tax-exempt
status.11 For instance, Congress exempts many special interests from
federal income tax, such as trade associations, social welfare
organizations, and labor unions.12 No one has offered a strong theory
supporting this policy to subsidize groups that work to influence our
political system. Given the attempts we make to limit the ability of
interest groups to influence our elections and policy generally, 13 this
choice is odd. While providing charitable organizations a subsidy can be
justified in part on the fact that they provide public benefits, labor unions
are little involved in provision of direct public benefits. As mutual benefit
organizations, they look to advance their members’ interests through
negotiating with management and seeking their wants through the
political process.
To evaluate the idea of tax exemption generally as it applies to labor
unions, I consider the major non-profit tax-exemption rationales. I find
them important, but unsatisfactory, because they all fail to consider the
important value of political voice equality. Market-failure theory suggests
we should subsidize organizations that offer goods or services subject to
market failure.14 While we can show a market failure in the case of labor
interests generally, the theory fails to tell us what type of market failure is
necessary to justify the subsidy. Government failure theory suggests we
allow nonprofits to provide collective goods and services that the
government fails to provide. 15 This theory focuses on goods and services
that are not critical to the functioning and decision making of the
10

26 U.S.C.A. § 501 (West 2014).
There are limits of course. A particular company cannot form a business league to
support its own product. It must instead form to support a line of business. None of the taxexempt interest group organizations can engage primarily in political campaign activity.
12 26 U.S.C.A. § 501(c)(4)–(6) (West 2014). These are respectively social welfare
organizations, labor organizations, and trade associations. Although the Code refers to labor
unions as labor organizations, I will refer to “labor unions” in the rest of the paper.
13 ANTHONY CORRADO ET AL., THE NEW CAMPAIGN FINANCE SOURCEBOOK 2–6 (2005).
14 Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate
Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 67–70 (1981) (most clearly articulating contract failure theory).
15 Burton Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in a Three-Sector
Economy, 21 in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed. 1986) (most
clearly articulating government failure theory).
11
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government itself. Interest groups however are fundamental to the
government structure itself. Government failure theory fails to consider
whether there might be a different quality and importance to such
services. Pluralism theory considers the deeply political nature of much of
our nonprofit tax exempt sector; it contends that we should exempt
nonprofit organizations from tax to facilitate democracy. The central idea
of this theory is the more political voices we highlight, the better off our
democracy. The theory, however, fails to consider that many nonprofit
interests face little to no collective action problem. Those organizations
with greater wealth and skill are likely to face less of a collective action
problem and also more likely to draw a greater return from the subsidy.
Thus, the subsidy will work to enhance the voice of those already strong.
This enhancement is likely to work to drown out weaker voices.
There are many theoretical or functional lenses through which we
could view these nonprofit organizations. We could look at the impact
they might have on our economy in a functional sense such as how the
presence of labor unions impact the distribution of resources. We could
then assess in a theoretical sense whether the presence of labor unions
results in a more fair distribution of resources. However, I contend that
viewing them through a functional lens, such as viewing them in their
interest group role, and through a theoretical lens, such as the governance
role they play in our democracy, provides the most significant and
important insights to our tax policy.
I have previously examined tax-exempt business leagues through the
lens of interest group literature. 16 An interest group is “a collection of
individuals or a group of individuals linked together by professional
circumstance, or by common political, economic, or social interests” that
satisfies three requirements: (1) the organization is not a political party,
that is, the name of the organization does not appear on a ballot; (2) it
uses some of its resources to try to influence legislative, judicial, or
executive decisions at any level of government; and (3) it is organized
outside of the government it intends to influence. 17 Viewed as an interest
group primarily, we can see that business leagues do not face significant
collective action problems and cannot be shown to face some other
significant market failure to warrant tax exemption. 18 Just as a matter of

16 Philip T. Hackney, Taxing the Unheavenly Chorus: Why Section 501(c)(6) Trade
Associations are Undeserving of Tax Exemption, 92 DEN. U. L. REV. 265, 269 (2015) (hereinafter
Taxing the Unheavenly).
17 JOHN R. WRIGHT, INTEREST GROUPS AND CONGRESS: LOBBYING, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND INFLUENCE
22–23 (1996) (internal quotation mark omitted).
18 Taxing the Unheavenly, supra note 16.

MPP_HACKNEY

200x]

11/9/2017 5:46 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

107

its place in the marketplace, there is no indication that there is any
general lack of business interest groups.
Labor interests are also interest groups, but they present a different
case. Theory suggests a large, latent interest like that of labor should
experience high difficulty in organizing to provide the collective goods of
representation before government and bargaining with employers.19
Evidence shows that labor is highly underrepresented politically. In a
study from 2001, labor made up only 1% of the interest group sector. 20
That was compared to business nonprofit interest representation of 20
percent and business corporations at 35 percent. There is, thus, evidence
that a severe market failure hinders labor from representing itself in the
market and before government in a comparative sense. This suggests that
current tax exemption policy generally has it backwards. Instead of
providing every group exemption we should tailor exemption only to
those groups that really need the assistance. Additionally, generally
denying labor union members the ability to deduct union dues is likely to
directly harm political voice equality where business interests so readily
have access to that deduction.21
This Article contributes to the tax legal literature by providing an
analysis of labor unions and how we tax them. Although labor unions as a
whole are a very small part of our economy and tax system, by looking at
one narrow section of the tax-exempt sector we can shed light on the rest
of the exempt sector. Additionally, although most tax policy scholarship
focuses on one of three values—equity in an economic sense, efficiency in
an economic sense, and administrability—I focus primarily on the value of
equity in a governance sense.
I argue that at least in the sphere of tax where tax choices directly
impact our democracy, we should take into consideration values of

19

MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 57–59 (20th prtg. 2002) (hereinafter
COLLECTIVE ACTION).
20 KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN ET AL., THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS 321 tbl.11.3 (2012).
21 When looking at a tax subsidy, it is important to consider whether the person who is
named as the beneficiary of the deduction will be incentivized by that deduction. That question
is the question of who receives the incidence of the subsidy. That question depends on the
elasticity of a union member to paying union dues. Given the substantial challenge in organizing
unions, it seems likely that, at least as an initial matter without the consideration of any other
laws, labor union members are highly elastic as to whether they will pay union dues or not. Their
return is unclear and is often unlikely to exceed the annual cost. Where there is a union shop,
however, that requires union members to pay union dues whether they want to belong or not,
the answer is obviously different. Nevertheless, the primary other party that might receive the
incidence of the money gained through the deduction would be the union itself, meaning that
the question of who gains the incidence of the deduction does not matter if all we care about is
whether the policy would increase union activity or not.

HACKNEY PROP UP HEAVENLY DRAFT 11917

108

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

11/9/2017 5:46 PM

[Vol. XX:nn

democracy. In that sphere, we should not adopt tax policies that increase
political voice inequality. Also, it is reasonable to adopt tax policies that
increase the equality of political voice. Because I find that our current
taxing system of interest groups broadly increases political voice
inequality, I find our tax system wanting and make recommendations for
change.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I covers the tax treatment of
labor interests. Part II begins to build a social choice function model by
sketching the case for democracy and thereby political equality. Part III
completes the social choice function model by highlighting the role of
groups such as labor unions within a democracy and evaluates the role
groups play in the matter of political equality. Part IV describes the
history and tax law of labor unions. Some who are unfamiliar with the taxexemption requirements of labor unions might want to jump to Part IV.B
for a discussion of that area of the law first. Part V assesses theories
regarding the rationale for exempting nonprofit organizations. Part VI
analyzes the implications of democratic group theory for the tax
treatment of labor interests. Part VII concludes.
I.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF TAX TREATMENT OF LABOR INTERESTS

This Part looks at the technical tax treatment of labor union income
and the payment by members of labor union dues. There are three
primary types of labor union income: (1) member income, (2) nonmember
income, and (3) investment income.22 An initial question is whether the
“income” exempted is “real income” that should in the ordinary course of
an income tax be taxed. Because there appears to be a real transaction in
a commercial space between individuals and a legal entity to acquire
services or goods from that entity, the income exempted seems to be real
income that would ordinarily be taxed in our economy; any decision to
exempt that income should supported by a policy intended to incentivize
this activity. Labor union dues will be considered at the end of this Part.
(1) Member Income. Labor union members pay member dues to the
union. Those dues entitle members to certain rights and benefits that
have a value.23 For instance, in exchange for the dues, the union might
engage in collective bargaining on behalf of the employees and might also
defend an employee who has a dispute with management. In effect, the
labor union provides services to its members in exchange for a fee just the

22

Taxing the Unheavenly, supra note 16, at 268.
Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from
Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 354 (1976)
23
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way a health club provides services to its members in exchange for a fee.
Assuming that the labor union is a separate legal entity from its members,
this transaction should result in income to the labor union for the
purposes of the income tax.
United States tax law treats a corporation as a legal entity that is
separate and apart from its members. 24 Under that theory, when a
member pays dues to a union in exchange for certain goods and services
he is dealing with a legal entity that is separate from himself. Generally,
our income tax law has treated such a moment as a moment to recognize
income for tax purposes.25 However, some do not accept member dues as
income of the nonprofit. 26 They argue that the nonprofit corporation is no
more than a place where nonprofit members are pooling income to do
things nonprofit members could do on their own. The idea is that
neighbors A, B, and C could pool money to construct a tennis court. A, B,
and C would then each pay the costs of maintaining the court. We should
not suddenly tax A, B, and C as an entity simply because they are carrying
on activity together. Utilizing this characterization to describe a large
complex organization like a union that is an interest group delivering
collective benefits seems questionable. The key aspect of interest groups
is that they form because no member could provide these collective goods
and services on his own. The entity and collective action of members
joined together is necessary for its power. There is a real difference
between the member and the organization.
In any case, not all member income is easily placed into the pooling
income basket, even if you accept the pooling income argument. Where a
union sells goods or services that are not core goods or services of the
union, we might think of this income differently. Thus, where a union sells
education, or insurance, or death benefits to its members, we might think
24

Moline Properties, Inc. v. Comm’r, 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
However, there is a real question as to why we would apply a tax to a corporate entity. A
corporate entity is a legal fiction, after all. I take a look at that question in: Philip T. Hackney,
What we Talk About When We Talk About Tax Exemption, 33 VA. TAX REV. 101 (2013). There I
argue that the two best theories are the shareholder theory that holds we tax corporations to
tax the shareholders, and the real entity theory that suggests the corporation is a thing that has
power that can be regulated through taxation. Both of these theories could arguably apply to a
labor union, making it a good subject of taxation.
26 See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations
from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 343 (1976) (discussing the idea that we might
view church congregations as only pooling resources rather than selling services); David S.
Miller, Reforming the Taxation of Exempt Organizations and Their Patrons, 652 TAX F. 1, 2 n. 5
(2013) (discussing that legislators adopted the tax exemption scheme for social clubs in order to
not impose harmful tax consequences on those who choose to pool their resources together to
engage in recreation); Daniel Halperin, Income Taxation of Mutual Nonprofits, 59 TAX L. REV. 133,
134 (2006).
25

HACKNEY PROP UP HEAVENLY DRAFT 11917

110

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

11/9/2017 5:46 PM

[Vol. XX:nn

of it differently than when it sells collective-bargaining with an employer.
In the end, unions sell services that differ little from normal business
activity that we apply the income tax to in most other situations.
Members pay dues to acquire collective bargaining with an employer,
magazine subscriptions, management grievance protection, and some
lobbying and political activity. It is worth justifying why we would diverge
in income tax treatment for this type of financial arrangement.
(2) Nonmember Income. A union generates nonmember income
when an individual who is not considered to be a member pays the union
for goods or services.27 For instance, some unions sell health insurance to
those who are not members of the union. This type of sale results in nonmember income to the union. The union realizes income to the extent the
amount paid exceeds the costs of that good or service. Most theorists
consider this income as income that should be taxed in a normal income
tax system. Exemption of this income is effectively a subsidy to the union
to the extent we do not tax it. With other mutual benefit nonprofits,
social clubs for instance, Congress rightly taxes such nonmember
income.28
(3) Investment Income. Investment income is the return from stocks
and bonds or other capital investments.29 Most theorists also accept the
exemption of this income as a subsidy to a nonprofit organization. An
individual cannot generally invest income and avoid the income tax on the
return from that investment. In effect, allowing tax exemption for a
particular purpose allows the creation of a communal tax-free investment
vehicle for that purpose in the same way we allow individuals to establish
tax-free savings vehicles for retirement or education for their children.
Impact of Tax Exemption. The regime of tax-exemption encourages a
nonprofit to hold earnings beyond a taxable period. This is because taxexemption only provides a subsidy to the extent there are earnings and
those earnings are not immediately spent within a particular taxable year.
Additionally, exemption provides primarily a benefit of the deferral of tax
rather than permanently exempting income from tax. Union dues are
technically deductible unless they are used for lobbying or political
activity. To the extent that the union holds money from one year to the
next, the main issue would be that the member got to deduct the amount
early. Of course, this does not take into consideration the different tax
rates involved between union members and the corporation, or different
tax rates over time, or the fact that union members change over time.
27
28
29

See Halperin, Income Taxation of Mutual Nonprofits, 59 TAX L. REV. 133, 136.
26 U.S.C.A. § 513 (West 2014).
Taxing the Unheavenly, supra note 16, at 293.
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If a union were taxable, it could avoid tax, or at least lower its taxable
income, by ensuring revenues and expenses closely match. This may be
difficult for a union because they typically act in part as an insurance
service to the extent they hold strike funds or provide other insurance-like
benefits to members. Additionally, any organization that is looking for
stability values maintaining some savings. Thus, many unions would likely
hold some percentage of profits into a future year.
Taxation of Union Dues. A union member’s payment of dues is
generally a deductible business expense. 30 However, most union
members are unable to deduct this amount. Union dues are a
miscellaneous itemized deduction.31 Such a deduction can only be
deducted to the extent all similar deductions exceed two percent of the
individual’s adjusted gross income. For instance, a union member with
$60,000 in adjusted gross income can only deduct union dues along with
other miscellaneous items to the extent all of those items exceed $1,200.
If that union member pays $400 in union dues, but incurs no other
miscellaneous itemized deduction, he will not be able to deduct the
amount. Even if the union member gets past this hurdle in part, the
standard deduction is likely greater than the union member’s total
itemized deductions, meaning, again, that the union member will not be
able to deduct this business expense.
The comparison to the businessman’s trade union dues is important.
As a business expense those dues are deductible immediately from gross
income above the line. There is no itemizing for the businessman. His
income is most instances reduces his gross income.
It is quite possible that because union members generally cannot
deduct their union dues that labor interests are overtaxed rather than
undertaxed. I will return to this point in Part VI when I analyze the case
for how to tax labor interests.
II.

DEMOCRACY AND THE ROLE OF GROUPS THEREIN

Most normative income tax scholarship focuses upon either an
economic efficiency or economic fairness dimension to model an ideal
system or to critique the current one. It asks whether a tax system is the
most economically efficient or the most economically fair to different
groups and classes of people. Nevertheless, in this Article, I primarily
critique our tax system on the dimension of democracy and political voice

30

26 U.S.C.A. § 162 (2000). However, dues used for lobbying or political campaign activity
are not deductible under § 162(e).
31 26 U.S.C.A. § 67 (2000).
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equality. On economic fairness, many utilize an entitlement or welfarist
model to assess policy.32 On economic efficiency, scholars often use the
Pareto (or Kaldor-Hicks) efficiency of a competitive market as a model to
assess policy.33 We lack a model to assess political fairness in a
democratic system.34 This Part, thus, sketches a model of an ideal
democratic system and the role that political voice equality plays within
that system.
Many elements of our tax system directly impact our democracy.
The choice to adopt a progressive tax, the choice to impose an estate tax,
the choice to apply a corporate tax, and the choice to exempt some
organizations from that tax all impact our democratic system by impacting
the political voice of various citizens and entities. Thus, it is worthwhile to
consider the tax systems impact on our democracy even in one small part
of the system in order to evaluate the income tax’s impact on democracy
more broadly.
Should political voice equality be the sole or primary driver of income
tax policy? No. Imposing confiscatory taxes to try to ensure perfect
political voice equality is likely both problematic from an efficiency
standpoint and American norms of fairness. While striving towards
democracy is critical to a fair society, there are other important factors
critical to assessing a tax system including its economic fairness and
efficiency. The democracy-enhancing nature of a policy is only one factor
in analyzing a tax system. In the case of tax exemption, though, it is a
particularly important factor, and maybe even the defining factor.
This first part sketches the necessary conditions of democracy,
discusses why democracy, and focuses closely on the element of political
equality.35 A model of an ideal democracy allows us to critique its current
form in the United States and to assess whether our choices of taxation
impact our democracy in a positive or negative way. Finally, it examines
32 Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look
at Progressive Taxation, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1905, 1915 (1987).
33 Eric M. Zolt, The Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation, 16 VA. TAX REV. 39, 62 (1996).
34 See, e.g., David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market
Salience and Political Salience, 65 TAX L. REV. 19, 80 (2011) (discussing the lack of a baseline to
assess a neutral political system); David Lowery et. al., Images of an Unbiased Interest System,
22 J. EUR. PUB. POL. 1212, 1212–13 (2015) (discussing that individual participation can be
modeled on one-person one-vote, but that a pluralist group system lacks any coherent baseline
upon which to judge whether it is unbiased).
35 In sketching this account of democracy, I rely heavily upon the work of Robert Dahl. In
particular, I rely upon: ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989); ROBERT A. DAHL, ON
DEMOCRACY (2nd ed. 2015) [hereinafter ON DEMOCRACY]; ROBERT A. DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2nd ed. 2003); ROBERT A. DAHL, ON POLITICAL EQUALITY (2006) [hereinafter
ON POLITICAL EQUALITY].
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the role groups play within that system. Some might question the need to
detail why democracy. However, many have different conceptions of what
democracy might mean and this effort will help clarify the terms of
democracy. Additionally, some do not really believe in democracy after all.
The Founders themselves, for instance, were highly distrustful of
unfettered democracy and designed a system to combat against a
majority taking complete control. Someone who does not believe
democracy to be the right form of government may also not accept the
conclusions of this Article.
A.

How and Why Democracy?

The fundamental question in considering politics is how the group is
going to decide what to do. In other words, who gets to determine what
is in the best interest of the group, the association, the state? The simplest
and most direct answer to this question is: “[a]mong adults no persons are
so definitely better qualified than others to govern that they should be
entrusted with complete and final authority over the government of the
state.”36 To put it more positively, we can make the moral judgment that
all people are of equal, intrinsic worth and, therefore, ought to have an
equal say in deciding what the group is going to do. Professor Robert Dahl
refers to this as the principle of “intrinsic equality.”37 Once you accept this
moral judgment about individuals, there are a series of principles that lead
you to some form of democratic government. Democracy is an imperfect
system of government that is littered with contradictions; and yet, if you
accept the basic principal of intrinsic equality, democracy appears to be
the best choice.
What are the ideal requirements for a democracy? A democracy
must allow all individuals an opportunity to participate in discussing
options before a decision is final.38 That opportunity must be equal and
real. All individuals in the democracy must have an equal vote in any final
decision.39 All the members must have an equal and real opportunity to
examine and understand both the policy being considered for a vote and
all reasonable alternatives.40 That understanding should include an
appreciation of the consequences of the decisions. Similarly, all members
must be involved in setting the agenda of the association. 41 Finally, all
36
37
38
39
40
41

ON POLITICAL EQUALITY, supra note 35, at 4.
ON POLITICAL EQUALITY, supra note 35, at 4.
ON DEMOCRACY, supra note 35, at 37.
ON DEMOCRACY, supra note 35, at 37.
ON DEMOCRACY, supra note 35, at 37.
ON DEMOCRACY, supra note 35, at 37.

HACKNEY PROP UP HEAVENLY DRAFT 11917

114

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

11/9/2017 5:46 PM

[Vol. XX:nn

competent individuals in the association, which generally means all adults,
must have these rights. 42 To the extent any of these requirements are
missing, political equality will be lacking.43
To highlight what this means it is useful to consider the two primary
alternatives to democracy—anarchism and guardianship.44 A theorist who
falls into either of these camps is much less likely to be persuaded by the
arguments in this Article, because the argument depends largely on an
acceptance of the principles of democracy. They may still support the
case in part because many of the principles are similar.
In a highly simplistic sense, an anarchist wants to maximize human
freedom and he believes that a state is the primary inhibitor of human
freedom.45 The fundamental principle of anarchism is that state coercion
is evil.46 Thus, even if a state employs a democratic process to make rules
and to enforce those rules, the anarchist will find that state illegitimate
because it also uses coercion. The anarchist believes the state should be
run by voluntary organizations instead of through a democratic process.47
Thus, an association or state following anarchist principles that wants to
follow some form of democracy needs complete unanimity to take action.
The anarchist powerfully criticizes democracy by pointing to the harm
of minority coercion. This is a problem for the democratic theorist
because he does not believe it right for someone else to make choices for
another. Like the anarchist, he believes that coercion is wrong. Thus, the
anarchist critique puts the democratic theorist in a bind. In a democracy,
the majority makes the choice for a demos and thereby coerces a
minority.48 The anarchist critique calls into question whether majority rule
is just. So, how does democracy withstand this critique? The answer is
twofold. First, the democratic theorist notes that anarchy is impractical
and maybe impossible. Second, he accepts that the coercion of the

42

ON DEMOCRACY, supra note 35, at 38.
ON DEMOCRACY, supra note 35, at 38.
44 DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 35, at 37.
45 DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 35, at 37. Anarchism is a very loosely held together
system of thought. For a decent discussion of it as both a theory and a movement, see April
Carter, The Political Theory of Anarchism (1971) (in particular see Chapter 2, Anarchism and the
State) http://www.ditext.com/carter/anarchism.html
46 DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 35, at 37.
47 An anarchist would presumably fully support tax exemption for any nonprofit
organization and would likely try to get as many aspects of our economy into that sector as
possible, in order to erase as much of the state as possible. A libertarian would likewise be
highly supportive of robust tax exemption for nonprofits. In both instances, though, they would
expect those entities to be completely voluntary.
48 DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 35, at 37.
43
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minority is problematic but argues that the democratic system, among
governmental systems, results in the least amount of coercion.
There are significant problems to the practicality of the anarchist
case. A key belief of the anarchist is that humans can successfully work
together solely through voluntary organizations. They believe it is possible
to operate a complex society with absolutely no coercion. However, there
are no credible examples of such a government succeeding.49
Additionally, there are two theoretical problems with the anarchist
solution. First, anarchists must believe that without a state there would
be no coercion.50 If they are right, then they have a good case; but, based
on almost all written history, it seems reasonable to conclude that
coercion is ubiquitous among humanity. In a society without a state, the
strong will almost certainly take advantage of the weak. If it can be shown
that you are likely to have less coercion via a democratic state, then the
anarchist argument under a utilitarian analysis should fail even under
anarchist theory. Second, most anarchist approaches depend upon some
form of coercion to overthrow the original state. 51 Thus, even anarchists
accept the coercion of others to get to a better moral situation.
The democratic theorist uses the anarchist’s acceptance of coercion
to support democracy. If coercion is acceptable to get to a better state,
presumably coercion might be just if it could be shown that this particular
coercion allowed a state to maintain the least amount of coercion. The
democratic theorist argues we achieve the least amount of coercion in a
state where a majority controls the decisions of the state, and we also
maximize the social choice function.52 Perhaps the most potent critique
though remains that unless an anarchist’s utopian vision of a society
without coercion can exist, the anarchist vision is simply unworkable.
Guardianship, unlike anarchism, is a practical alternative to
democracy. Plato most famously proposed this form of government in
The Republic.53 There he argued that we should establish a society that
trains a class of people who are exceptional individuals in that they are
both wise at governing and able to put the interests of the public ahead of
their own interests. B.F. Skinner also, in a more modern sense, made a
case for governance by psychologists.54 A guardianship theorist holds two
primary beliefs: (1) most people are incapable of governing, and (2)

49

DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 35, at 46.
DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 35, at 46.
51 DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 35, at 46.
52 DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 35, at 45.
53 See generally PLATO, THE REPUBLIC.
54 See generally B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY (2007).
50
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society can locate and train a small group of highly governance-capable
people.55 Guardianship thrives because many instinctively believe there is
some class of people that is qualified to govern, and conversely, that most
people are not capable of governing.
The guardianship theorist finds no problem supporting the first
proposition. Any review of the voting records of citizens, their
competence regarding basic civic facts, and their lack of an ability to think
of more than their own self-interests makes a pretty powerful statement
regarding limited ability of most people to govern. 56 It is the second
proposition that is problematic. Proponents of guardianship must be able
to also make the case that there are individuals who we can identify and
properly train to wisely rule. The proponent argues that because we
already pick individuals to perform highly complex tasks there is no reason
we cannot do the same for the task of governing.57 For instance, we
identify and train physicians to perform tasks that are very difficult and
subject to matters of life and death. There is no reason to believe we
could not do the same for our rulers argues the guardianship theorist.58
However, to make the positive case, we must be able to find this small
minority of individuals with the moral, instrumental, and practical
knowledge to govern, and these special people must be able to genuinely
put the public ahead of themselves. This seems highly implausible.
If we reject guardianship as impractical or impossible, can we justify
the principle of intrinsic equality? It is the building block of the
democratic idea. It justifies the ability for us to accept that all adults in
the group are capable of governance. The formation of the United States
as a democracy of course relied upon this principle in the Declaration of
Independence. But as suggested above by those who advocate
guardianship, it is by no means self-evident that all people are created
equal. We all differ in ability both intellectually and physically. These
differences might allow someone to reasonably conclude that there are
individuals who should govern because they have particularly strong
capabilities in that regard.
Nevertheless, there are still good reasons to accept the intrinsic
equality principle. First, almost all religious traditions and ethical
55

DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 35, at 59.
See, e.g., BRYAN CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER (2008) (making the case that
most Americans are so ignorant of economic policy that they are not capable of governing on
matters of economics); cf. MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE 13 (2014) (arguing that
although the governing capabilities of most Americans are very low, they have enough capacity
to govern themselves).
57 Democracy AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 35, at 62.
58 DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 35, at 62–63.
56
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traditions operate on this principle.59 Second as explored in part when
considering guardianship, all other principles are weaker. 60 Those who are
in the glorified category of superior are almost certainly convinced they
are correct, but the others who are not considered superior are likely to
disagree. Third, the principle is supported by prudence. 61 It is the
principle that best ensures we are treated as fair as possible. Finally,
although perhaps guilty of circular reasoning, the principle is likely to be
acceptable to more total people than any other. 62 Again, the principle
maximizes the social choice function.
The principle of intrinsic equality leads to a conclusion that political
equality or political voice equality are necessary to any just political
system. Dahl labels this value “inclusion.”63 Political voice equality means
everyone in the group must have the opportunity to discuss potential
policies, set the agenda, and vote on final decisions. John Stuart Mill
spoke clearly on this point within a representative governmental context
when he chastised the British government for failing to include the
workingman in the decision-making. Mill said:
[D]oes Parliament, or almost any of the other members composing it,
ever for an instant look at any question with the eye of the working
man? When a subject arises in which the laborers as such have an
interest, is it regarded from any point of view but that of employers of
labor?64

This critique still has powerful resonance today as we will see when we
review what the political voice of labor looks like today in the United
States.
Beyond the principle of intrinsic equality, the other fundamental
matter to democracy is the decisionmaking process. A democracy
operates based on majority rule to maximize possible political equality in
final decisions. In a utilitarian sense, the procedural rule of decisionmaking based on majority rule should insure that the greatest number of
people get their way on a particular policy. The rule should maximize the
amount of freedom of the individuals of an association or state to govern
themselves. That is simple enough. However, the challenge is what to do
if the majority adopts a rule that hinders some of the identified necessary
elements of a democracy?

59
60
61
62
63
64

ON DEMOCRACY, at 66. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 291 (expanded ed. 2005).
ON DEMOCRACY, at 66.
ON DEMOCRACY, at 67.
ON DEMOCRACY, at 67.
ON DEMOCRACY, at 76.
JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1861).
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Once a final decision is made by majority rule, there will be some
who did not get their choice. This of course is fine. But, if the majority
eliminates a fundamental right (or rights) of a democracy then we no
longer have a democracy. The typical solutions to this problem is that we
either develop a populace that respects the norms of democracy, or we
establish an undemocratic means of enforcing fundamental rights—a
Supreme Court, for example.65 The other challenging but integrally
related question, considered in the next Section below, is how to
operationalize the ideal democratic principles into a modern, large state?
This, after all, is what we have in the United States and is the more
relevant issue for considering the place of a labor union in our democracy.
B.

Application of Ideal Democracy to the Large Modern State—the
Problem with Groups

Ideal democratic theory is utopian in nature. Once a group is too
large, it is impractical to achieve ideal democratic conditions. Providing a
real opportunity to speak, consider and decide to ten people is a much
different proposition than providing such rights to one thousand people
much less one millon people. In a large state, political voice equality
simply becomes impossible. A number of factors lead to this problem: (1)
differing abilities and resources; (2) scarcity of time for individuals; (3)
numerosity; (4) the fact that the market impacts so many decisions; (5)
the existence of international systems that impact our democratic choices;
and (6) the reality that crises will occur. 66 Each of these factors mean that
certain individuals or organizations with greater skill, greater money, and
greater time will have more time to influence the agenda, the information,
and the final decision of a large state. It means that we will likely stray far
from the ideals of democracy we have already identified. We will lack
political equality among citizens.
Nevertheless, ideal democratic theory provides a model for large
democratic states to measure their success and to aim to develop
institutions that mimic the goals of the ideal democratic state. In order to
achieve something close to democracy, large, modern democratic states,
or polyarchies,67: (1) elect representatives of the people; (2) conduct
elections regularly with fairness and without coercion; (3) guarantee
freedom of speech particularly on matters of criticizing the political
system; (4) provide robust “[a]ccess to alternative sources of information”

65
66
67

DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, at 155, 173.
ON POLITICAL EQUALITY, at 50–51.
DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, at 117.
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outside of the governmental regime; (5) allow associations, including
political parties and interest groups, to form with ease; and (6) allow all
adults to fully participate in all of the five freedoms listed above.68
These institutions, in one sense, seem self-evident. Because there is
no way to operate a pure democracy in a polyarchy, electing
representatives becomes the only functional way for the society to govern
itself. To obtain accountability of representatives, a polyarchy must adopt
frequent elections.69 Perhaps, most critically, freedom of speech,
information, and association become the foundation of democracy. These
measures ensure all of society has at least an opportunity to participate in
information-gathering and agenda-setting. While citizens will not
generally get a say in final decisions made by their representatives, at
least they are never shut out of the discussion if these institutions are
maintained.
However, do these five fundamental rights identified above ensure
political equality necessary in ideal democratic theory? No. While
implicitly found throughout those rights, none of those rights mandates a
right to political equality. Because of the large size of the demos and the
number and complexity of issues before the demos, most citizens will
have no opportunity to participate in understanding the issues before the
demos or in developing the information about alternative policies. Any
citizen who is not a representative gets no vote on final decisions of the
demos and most citizens will have only limited opportunity to participate
in the decision-making process. Political equality in its ideal sense simply
cannot exist in a polyarchy.
In the same way that a polyarchy utilizes representatives to make
final decisions, a natural solution to part of the political equality problem
in a polyarchy is to rely on groups of individuals with political interests to
speak on behalf of citizens to equalize citizen voices—that is, interest
groups. This might be better thought of as political voice equality. The
pluralists in the 1940s and 1950s argued that interest groups solved the
problem of political voice equality. In the pluralist view, interest groups
form for every possible citizen interest and express the voice of those
many interests to representatives.70 Are they right?
While the pluralists present a relatively positive vision of group
activity in a democracy, there is a distinctly negative vision of interest
groups in American thought. Many say that the problem with the
68

ON DEMOCRACY, at 85–86.
ON DEMOCRACY, at 95–96.
70 Cf. ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY 207 (1982) (denying any pluralist
actually ever held this facile of a notion of pluralist theory).
69
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governance of the United States is those interest groups that the pluralist
glorifies are instead “special interests” that harm democratic equality. In
this vision, special interests push citizens to the side and control our
government. They cause harm to our democratic system by moving policy
toward primarily wealthy interests rather than toward some common
public interest.71 Professor Jeffery Berry says “there is a widespread
popular perception that interest groups are a cancer spreading unchecked
throughout the body politic.”72 The sense is that these special interests
pervert the will of the people and replace it with the will of the wealthy,
the elite, and the well-connected.
Group activity presents a challenge to a democracy. Each group may
represent a common interest as to its members, but the group will
present a selfish interest as to the demos. This group activity then
destroys the ancient political goal of government seeking some common
public good. In a polyarchy, it is rare that we can find a common good.
This is the pluralist problem in a polyarchy. The principles of democracy
require even greater suffrage, and yet as those additional members come
into the demos the irreconcilable conflicts become ubiquitous. The
democracy becomes a battle of groups for power rather than a collective
of people searching for a path to the common good.
In Federalist 10, James Madison warned of the dangers of factions
that he defined as groups of citizens organized to promote some common
interest that is adverse to the rights of other citizens or the common good
of the polity.73 Madison believed a minority faction was not to be feared
because the majority could ensure through the simple power of
numerosity that the minority could not control. 74 He feared that a
majority faction threatened the public good and the rights of citizens,75
and therefore thought pure democracy was susceptible to tyrannical

71

JEFFREY M. BERRY, THE INTEREST GROUP SOCIETY 16 (2009).
Id.
73 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 48 (James Madison). This point is important. Madison believed
that there could be a single common will or public interest. Today, most doubt the idea that a
singular public interest exists. In a polyarchy, there is a vast diversity of opinion as to the right
direction for the polity to take. ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 160 (expanded
ed. 2006) [hereinafter A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY].
74 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 73, at 51.
75 Although Madison was involved in forming our democratic constitution, he seemed a
proponent of guardianship. He genuinely believed there were some better suited to govern than
others, and thought that a Republic was the best way to go about identifying those individuals. A
PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY, supra note 73, at 159. Madison was primarily concerned, as were
many of his generation, and prior governmental theorists, with the masses taking away property
rights. Id. at 161.
72
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abuse by a majority.76 Madison recognized,77 in a large country, some
form of associational pluralism is necessary to governance. 78 He believed
that these factions could be controlled by forming a large republic with
elected representatives of the people. 79 The large republic and
representatives, in this view, would work to disperse the power of a
majority faction.80
Perhaps accounting for some of the difference in the positive or
negative view of groups or factions in a democracy between the pluralist
and this Madisonian vision is that Madison seems to have built his political
theory on the assumption that a government should work to try to
accomplish a singular common good. 81 In the pluralist vision, there is no
such thing as a common good for a demos. The pluralist maintains that
we should allow a diversity of groups to seek their interests through
government.82 Rather than interest groups being the problem of
polyarchy to solve, interest groups are the solution to the challenge of
allowing all citizens’ voices to be heard. The common good is found in the
process of democracy, rather than in the results. In other words, the
focus is on a social choice function, rather than a social welfare function.
Whether there is a common good or not, there are still real problems
with the pluralist vision and solution. Pluralist scholars, Arthur Bentley
and David Truman, in their early writings, seemed to suggest that any
interest that wanted to form a group could in fact form that group. 83 An
interest is a collection of individuals that holds an interest in the
governmental provision of some good, service, or policy. Those citizens
may hold that interest and never form a group. Or, they may hold that
interest and organize into a group. That organization may be formalized
legally, or it might stay relatively unorganized. In the simple version of
pluralism, all interests face the same challenge in formation. Truman

76 When making this claim, he likely thought of groups like Shays’ Rebellion. DAVID TRUMAN,
THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 4 (Knopf ed. 1951).
77 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 73, at 51 (“The latent causes of faction are thus sown in
the nature of man.”).
78 DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 35, at 299. See also UNHEAVENLY CHORUS, supra note
1, at 270–71.
79 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 73, at 51.
80 Id.
81 A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY at 160.
82 DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 35, at 295.
83 UNHEAVENLY CHORUS, supra note 1, at 276. See Taxing the Unheavenly, supra note 16, at
274–78 (discussing the pluralist vision); see also E. PENDLETON HERRING, GROUP REPRESENTATION
BEFORE CONGRESS 22 (Johns Hopkins Press ed. 1929) (“Not only are almost all sorts of interests
and classes represented but also all sides of most questions as well.”).
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described interest formation and mobilization like waves. 84 One group,
like veterans, might organize to successfully seek pension benefits from
the federal government. Postal workers might see that and organize to
generate similar benefits, and private employees might seek such benefits
too. Employers might then organize to offset these new benefits. And so
it goes. Since that early work, many have identified significant problems
with the claim.
E.E. Schattshneider stated that “[t]he flaw in the pluralist heaven is
that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent.”85 What
he means is that when we look at the groups that organize and operate in
our democracy, we find that those groups overwhelmingly represent
wealthy interests. This is the collective action problem: Some interests,
such as the wealthy, are far more likely to organize and are far more likely
to be heard than the unorganized. Additionally, there is no way to ensure
equality of political voice when citizen voices come through different size
and power groups.86 We will always come up short on democracy when
we operate through groups. The problems do not stop there. Groups
suffer from an agency problem Association leaders often do not speak for
the will of the members but instead look out for their individual interests.
Finally, groups do not provide the only method through which policy is
made. Both elected representatives and individual citizens can have a real
impact on our government agenda and decisions.87
This significant lack of clarity in what an ideal polyarchy might look
like makes it difficult to model a just system. Building a model upon pure
democracy, of course, is the easiest. The principle of one person, one
political voice could be implemented by ensuring certain processes are
always followed to respect every citizen’s right to participate in the
polity’s decision-making. Obviously, this is far to simple for the complexity
of a polyarchy. Nevertheless, modeled off of the one person, one political
voice principle, we might assume that there should be some sense of
balance in the interest group sector. To the extent there is a lack of
balance we might reasonably conclude that our democracy is coming up
short on political voice equality. This model will have significant flaws, but
it seems a reasonable starting place for policy makers to consider the
difference in power among groups and among citizens. If we are trying to

84

TRUMAN, supra note 76, at 59.
E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
35 (1960).
86 See SCHLOZMAN, supra note 1, at 271–75.
87 See, e.g., Arthur T. Denzau & Michael C. Munger, Legislators and Interest Groups: How
Unorganized Interests Get Represented, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 89, 89–90 (1986).
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maximize a social choice function, it again seems reasonable that we
should not exacerbate the power differential of these groups. As will be
discussed more below, we might even try to enhance the voice of some
weaker groups.
With this model in mind, the challenges presented by groups in a
democracy and the collective action problem in the specific context of
labor interests is considered in the next Part. What is the relative power
of labor as compared to business interests and other groups?
III. LABOR UNIONS: COLLECTIVE ACTION AND REPRESENTATIONAL PROBLEMS
Labor unions negotiate employment terms for all the employees of a
bargaining unit, make it possible through strike pay for union members to
strike to obtain better employment benefits, and lobby and engage in
politicking to obtain the best laws for its members. Labor unions are
fundamentally an interest group that provides a collective good and
service to people who are employees.88 Labor union members tend to
come from lower to middle income families. Because of the collective
action problem discussed below there are reasons to believe labor
interests will have a hard time organizing to advance their political voice.
The potential group of labor union members is large and the individual
return from organizing is likely far less than the costs of joining.
Furthermore, by law, to act on behalf of labor, a majority of employees in
a bargaining unit must vote for a particular labor union. This means that
labor unions face a severe collective action problem.89
“[M]ovements by the ‘powerless’ require strong and sustained
outside support.”90 Those who earn an hourly wage working for a
company have long tended to have great challenges acting collectively.
Additionally, they have little role or say in the acts taken by their
corporate employers.91 Businesses made up of a few organizations that
possess money and skills tend to have a much easier time organizing and
representing their interests before the government. 92 Thus, we should
expect our political balance to be skewed away from labor interests and
towards business interests.
This Part finds the power of labor as compared to some other
interests within our democracy to be particularly weak. Additionally, this
88

JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS 119 (1995).
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90 J. Craig Jenkins & Charles Perrow, Insurgency of the Powerless: Farm Worker Movements
(1946–1972), 42 AM. SOC. REV. 249, 251 (1977).
91 Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283, 283 (1998).
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Part evaluates the composition of labor unions and finds that there is not
significant diversity of voices among different labor interests or localities.
Certain regions and certain occupations are much more represented
through this system. This unequal state of affairs in the interest group
ecosystem seems to be consistent across the interest group domain.
Finally, it looks at evidence on whether unions represent some common
will of their members. It finds that there is evidence that the
representation is biased to a certain extent towards managers. This is
consistent as well across the interest group domain.
Thus,
problematically, even if labor is representing some labor voices, there are
lots of labor voices that are left out of the political system.
A.

Collective Action Problem and Labor Union Evidence

The theory of collective action predicts that interests made up of a
small number of individuals under circumstances where the return from
the interest being fulfilled is high will be more likely to organize than those
interests held by many where the return is small.93
Citizens who have a shared interest in some good or service may
desire to get their government to provide the good, service, or policy. If
we assume that this citizen is the rational, economically interested
woman, when she looks at the question of whether to seek from the
government the provision of that good, service, or policy she will make an
economic calculation. Will the return from her effort be greater than the
cost? We can also refer to this sought good, service or policy as a
collective good. By that I mean that once the good is provided, it will be
provided to everyone. Thus, there will be a couple of challenges.
Generally, the return of these types of collective goods is going to be
smaller than the costs. Additionally, because the good is available to all,
there is a free rider problem.
Under Mancur Olson’s theory, industries populated by few players
should be successful in organizing to seek their interests while individuals
with shared interests who are vast in quantity, like manufacturing
workers, should generally not be successful in organizing.94 Similarly, we
should expect to see differences in ability to organize based on human
and capital resources. Those interests associated with wealth and
education are much more likely to organize than those associated with
poverty and lack of education. Evidence is strong that the basic contours

93
94

COLLECTIVE ACTION, supra note 19, at 57–59.
COLLECTIVE ACTION, at 57–59.

MPP_HACKNEY

200x]

11/9/2017 5:46 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

125

of these predictions hold.95 Small wealthy groups form organizations with
greater ease than large disperse organizations with small value to each
individual member. However, the theory is not perfect. There is evidence
that some citizen movements organize more often than Olson’s theory
predicted.96
Large groups seem to solve the collective action problem through
three primary means: force of law, selective incentives, or purposive
incentives.97 Trade associations and unions are both sometimes able to
overcome the collective action problem by force of law. For instance, a
legislative body might pass a law forcing those interested in working in a
particular profession to join a professional association, like a state bar, in
order to work; in union parlance, this describes a “closed shop.”
“[S]elective incentives” refer to selling a good or service that the seller can
exclude others from acquiring, such as magazines or insurance. 98 Finally,
“purposive incentives” refer to incentives associated with feeling good
morally or otherwise because you join a group.99
Olson considered labor unions in his book setting forth his theory of
collection action. He found evidence of the challenge of labor to organize
in the history of the labor movement. Early U.S. labor unions mostly
consisted of local “small-scale production” operations, like building trades,
shoemakers, and printers, rather than fields characterized as large
manufacturing operations.100 Olson thought this state of affairs was a
result of the fact that social benefits of the smaller unions were easier for
members to see. Nevertheless, over time there was a tendency for the
small unions to connect on a national level. Although unions start small,
there is a natural tendency towards local unions organizing with a national
union. Locals join national organizations because the connection to a
larger groups provides real insurance effects. More importantly though,
locals join a national organization for the simple fact that an employer
finds it relatively easy to break a strike led only in one localized union. 101
As mentioned, one of the ways any interest can solve the collective
action problem is to get a law passed mandating those interested in
working in a particular job to join that organization. To Olson, the
predominant means by which large unions overcame the collective action
95

See SCHLOZMAN, supra note 1, at 319–20.
Jack L. Walker, The Origins and Maintenance of Interest Groups in America, 77 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 390, 396 (1983).
97 Taxing the Unheavenly, supra note 16, at 277, 282.
98 Taxing the Unheavenly, supra note 16, at 277.
99 Taxing the Unheavenly, supra note 16, at 282.
100 COLLECTIVE ACTION, supra note 19, at 66.
101 COLLECTIVE ACTION, supra note 19, at 67–68.
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problem was by implementing closed shops. There were some closed
shops in early U.S. history, including carters in the 1600s, shoemakers in
the 1800s, and printers later in the 1800s.102 Problematically for unions,
Congress banned the closed shop in the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, as
described in Part IV below.
Labor unions have also long offered various selective incentives, such
as insurance-related benefits, to attract members. This might include
death, unemployment, disability or old age benefits. 103 Only large unions
today tend to offer significant benefits such as education, scholarships,
and medical care.104 The growth of government provided benefits such as
social security and unemployment insurance, have likely cut significantly
into the selective incentives a union can offer.
Finally, labor unions use “purposive incentives.” In the case of
industrial low-skilled diverse work-forces, it is thought that the only
purposive incentive that is effective pre-union shop in organizing is “to be
aroused by emotionally charged and comprehensive appeals to their lot as
a dispossessed class.”105 The Industrial Workers of the World represented
many such individuals in pre-union shop situations, and its many efforts
led to intense and often violent strikes.106 These purposive incentives
almost certainly continue to play a role in union development and
maintenance in the U.S. today. This aspect of union organizing leads to
one of one of the negative features of unions: They tend to come with
violence both from laborers and employers.107 Of course, to obtain any
legal protections at all, a union first must overcome the collective action
challenge.
What does the balance of power of labor unions, as compared to
other types of interest groups, look like today? In an analysis of pure
numbers of interest groups, representing the whole of the interest group
sector at the Washington D.C. federal government level, labor unions
made up only one percent of the interest group sector. 108 Comparatively,
corporations made up 34.9%, trade and other business associations
13.2%, and occupational associations 6.8%. 109 While there are many other
types of interests in our government that diverge from capital versus
102

COLLECTIVE ACTION, supra note 19, at 69.
WILSON, supra note 88, at 124.
104 WILSON, supra note 88, at 124.
105 WILSON, supra note 88, at 128.
106 WILSON, supra note 88, at 128.
107 See, e.g., PHILIP TAFT, ORGANIZED LABOR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 68–83 (1964) (discussing a
particularly violent period of U.S. labor history).
108 UNHEAVENLY CHORUS, supra note 1, at 321 tbl. 11.3.
109 UNHEAVENLY CHORUS, supra note 1, at 321 tbl. 11.3.
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labor, this suggests at least that something is out of balance in this
representational system. A review of the interest group environment at
the state level demonstrates this severe imbalance as well. 110
What about if we look at political representation as compared to
employment status? In 2001, our U.S. workforce comprised 64 percent of
the population.111 Different roles were filled in the following ways:
executives 9.0%, professionals 10.2%, white collar workers 18.4%, blue
collar workers 24.0%, farm workers 1.5%, unemployed 3.2%, and not in
workforce 33.1%.112 How were each of these interests represented in the
interest group sector? Executives 73.9%, professionals 17.3%, white collar
workers 3.4%, blue collar workers 1.1%, farm workers 1.7%, unemployed
1.2%, and not in the workforce 1.4%. 113 Again, the degree of inequality in
representation of organized interests compared to labor is intense.
For labor, the story gets worse in a dynamic sense. When one looks
at the change in total number of groups, labor unions saw no growth
between 1981 and 2006.114 Meanwhile, the political interest with the
least amount of increase increased in number by 32 percent, and the
greatest sector increase was 883 percent, represented by health
interests.115 Labor unions thus shrunk from an already low 1.6% of the
interest group sector to just 0.8% of that sector. 116 More worrisome yet
for labor as a matter of political voice is the striking decline in labor union
members in the workforce.
In another measure of political voice, the number of opportunities
union staff has to testify in front of Congress is highly correlated with
union density.117 Instances of union congressional testimony have
dropped consistently with membership declines.118 Likewise, scholars
estimate that membership is the biggest determinant of electoral success
for a union.119 Others show that a greater number of members means
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David Lowery & Virginia Gray, Population Ecology of Gucci Gulch, or the Natural
Regulation of Interest Group Numbers in the American States, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1, 21 tbl. 2
(1995) [hereinafter Population Ecology].
111 UNHEAVENLY CHORUS, supra note 1, at 329 fig. 11.1.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 353 tbl. 12.1.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 356 tbl. 12.2.
117 Kyle W. Albert, An Analysis of Labor Union Participation in U.S. Congressional Hearings,
28 SOC. F. 574, 587 (2013).
118 Id. at 586–87.
119 DEREK C. BOK & JOHN T. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY (1970).
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more voters and more opportunities for financial contributions. 120 In a
seminal lobbying study looking at the trajectory of 139 issues over the
years 1999 to 2002, the authors spotted this same sense of highly limited
union representation before Congress.121 Although the unions made up
six percent of the mentions, those mentions were really only from about
six unions, where most other interests were represented by a range of
interest groups.122
Not surprisingly, studies show that labor unions tend to be outspent
in lobbying by corporations, business associations, and professional
associations. Labor averaged under $500,000 lobbying per union, while
the other three averaged all over $1,000,000.123 Additionally, while
corporations and business associations are very likely to have highly
connected lobbyists, labor unions seldom have such officials represent
their interests. 124 Finally, while unions do tend to have a higher average in
political activity committee spending, there are so many fewer of these
unions that labor as a broad interest is well outspent in this arena too. 125
One other interesting and disconcerting fact for labor unions is that
interests trying to overcome the collective action challenge can also face a
crowding out problem.126 Virginia Gray and David Lowery suggest that
there is an ecosystem of interest groups that is determinative of the size
and scope of that interest group sector.127 Under population ecology
theory, the number of a certain entity type is dependent upon things that
allow the entity type to exist. “[I]nterest-group density is set at an
equilibrium level by the environment.”128 Gray and Lowery find a positive
relationship between interest group size and population, constituent
interest in goods and services, the certainty of those interests, the age of
the interest system, and the size of the government. 129 In the end, there
are only so many organizations a certain population can support. Once it
120 Marrick F. Masters & John Thomas Delaney, Union Political Activities: A Review of the
Empirical Literature, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 336 (1987).
121 FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES, AND
WHY 9–10 (2009) [hereinafter LOBBYING AND POLICY].
122 Id. at 10.
123 Id. at 200. However, Baumgartner and co-authors do not find a strong connection
between policy outcomes and resources. Business seems to wind slightly more often, but not at
some significant rate. Id. at 203. They do not argue this does not mean money does not matter.
Instead they believe that the matter that money made happened in most instances long ago. Id.
at 212–14.
124 LOBBYING AND POLICY, at 200.
125 LOBBYING AND POLICY, at 200.
126 JEFFREY M. BERRY, THE NEW LIBERALISM 60 (1999).
127 Population Ecology, at 1.
128 Population Ecology, at 9.
129 Population Ecology, at 12.
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has filled its capacity, whether with environmental, business, and health
organizations, or charities, trade associations, and social welfare
organizations, the group system can run out of capacity to support more
organizations.
There is a major caveat to the collective action research project. The
work must be understood in light of a problem present in all of these
studies:130 It is impossible to know what an unbiased interest group sector
would look like.131 The Schattschneider vision of bias in the heavenly
chorus is based on a notion the interest group sector in an ideal sense
would be isomorphic with society. As Schlozman suggests, the baseline
for comparing organizational representation of interests might be to
assume one person, one vote. 132 But, there is no reason to believe this
would ever be the case. We should expect in fact that the interest group
sector will always diverge from that pure democracy notion. It is costly to
organize. This means that the many interests will never organize. People
tend to organize around certain factors, such as loss more than the
prospect of gain. 133 The dynamics of need for organizational involvement
should necessarily ebb and flow over time, such that it should never be
expected that organizations exactly mirror individual interests.134
B.

What do Unions Look Like Today?

Unionization makes a difference to the bottom line of workers.
Union workers earn a premium, as compared to non-union workers. Nonunion workers earned 79 percent of the weekly median salary of a union
worker.135 But, unions are quickly shrinking and we do not find
unionization equally across regions or job type.
In 2015, 14.8 million workers belonged to a union in the United
States.136 This made up 11.1% of the workforce. This is a significant
decline from 1983, when 17.7 million workers belonged to a union,

130

David Lowery et al., Images of an Unbiased Interest System, 22 J. EUR. PUB. 1212, 1221–

25.
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David Lowery & Virginia Gray, Bias in the Heavenly Chorus: Interests in Society and
Before Government, 16 J. THEORETICAL POL. 5, 6 (2004) [hereinafter Bias in the Heavenly].
132 Kay Lehman Schlozman, What Accent the Heavenly Chorus? Political Equality and the
American Pressure System, 46 J. POL. 1006, 1008–09 (1984).
133 Bias in the Heavenly, at 10–11.
134 Bias in the Heavenly, at 13.
135 News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union Members 2016
(Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm.
136 Id.
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making up 20.3% of the workforce.137 And, in 1954, 39 percent of the
private sector workforce was unionized.138 Public sector unions far
outpace their private sector counterparts today. In 2015, over 35 percent
of public sector workers were unionized, compared to only 6.7% of private
workers.139 In fact, at the local government level, 41.3% of the workforce
is unionized.140 The protective service industries—police officers and
firefighters, and education and libraries – make up the largest sector of
unions today.141 Union membership rates are highly state-dependent,
with New York exhibiting the highest rate of unionization at 24.7% and
South Carolina the lowest rate at 2.1%.142
The IRS tracks data regarding labor unions and other tax-exempt
organizations like business leagues exempt under section 501(c)(6). While
this data is not perfect because it only captures those organizations filing
applications and annual tax returns with the IRS and it depends on the
self-reporting of the entities, it does paint a relative picture to consider. In
that data you can see a similar reduction in labor unions particularly as
compared to business leagues. In looking at the rate of formation, it
appears that for every 1 labor union that forms, more than 3 business
leagues have formed from 2005 to 2016.143 Additionally, the total number
of unions registered with the IRS has continually shrunk from around
72,000 in 1990 to just under 47,000 in 2016. 144 Business leagues on the
other hand increased in number from 1990 (66,000) through 2010
(92,000), then declined through 2016 (64,000).145 Total assets and revenue
recorded with the IRS in Form 990 filings in comparison show a little
cleaner picture. While labor held about 70 percent of the assets held by
137

Id.
Dan Clawson & Mary Ann Clawson, What Has Happened to the US Labor Movement?
Union Decline and Renewal, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 95, 97 (1999).
139 News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union Members 2016
(Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 IRS Data BOOKS maintain that information from 2005-2016 on Table 24a. You can find
those here: https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-irs-data-book. The rate is the author’s
own calculation.
144 IRS Data Books 1990 Table 25 https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/16databk.pdf and 2016
Table 25 https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/16databk.pdf. As a result of Congress passing law in
2006 that forced small tax exempt organizations to file limited information with the IRS or lose
their tax exempt status, the entire tax exempt sector began declining in 2010. However the rate
of labor decline was almost continuous from 1990-2016.
145 As a result of Congress passing law in 2006 in the Pension Protection Act that forced
small tax exempt organizations to file limited information with the IRS or lose their tax exempt
status, the entire tax exempt sector began declining in 2010. This makes the data a bit messier
than it would otherwise appear.
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business leagues in 1990, it held only 54 percent in 2000 and then 46
percent in 2013.146 Total assets for labor unions rose from a little more
than $13 billion in 1990 to almost $37 billion in 2013. Assets just rose
more for business leagues from $19 billion to $80 billion over the same
period. Revenue of labor unions went from 67 percent of business league
revenue to only 51 percent of business league revenue from 1990 to 2013.
Union demographics have changed fairly significantly over the past
70 years. A study of the changing demographic trends in labor from 1952
to 1999 shows a change of unionized non-agricultural workforce
percentage from 33.2% in 1955 to 13.9% in 1999.147 In 2016 it was 10.7
percent. Although in the 1950s and 1960s the union workforce was over
80 percent blue-collar, by 1998, white-collar workers were the majority,
making up 55 percent of the unionized workforce.148 Although in 1952
almost 90 percent of union members were male, in 1998, over 40 percent
of union members were female. 149 That number kept increasing. By 2016
women made up 46 percent of union members.150 Although in the 1950s
almost no union members had any college experience much less a college
degree, in 1996, 25 percent of union members had some college or were
college graduates.151 By 2008 37.5 percent of union workers held a
college degree or greater. 152 Although in 1952 90 percent of union
members were white, in 1998, only 80 percent were white.153 The largest
non-white group of union members in 1998 was comprised of
Hispanics.154 In 1999, black men had a higher rate of unionization at
17.2% than whites at 13.5% or Hispanics at 11.9%.155
Today, public sector unions are the dominant unionized employees,
with teachers’ unions, such as the National Education Association and the

146

IRS Statistics of Income Charities and other Tax-Exempt Organizations Statistics from
1990 to 2013. https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-charities-and-other-tax-exemptorganizations-statistics
147 HERBERT B. ASHER ET AL., AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS IN THE ELECTORAL ARENA 26 (2001)
[hereinafter AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS].
148 Id. at 28–29.
149 Id. at 30.
150 News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union Members 2016, Table 1
(Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm.
151 AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS at 33. That percentage is apparently the same as the general
population.
152 JOHN SCHMITT & KRIS WARNER, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND POLICY RESEARCH, THE CHANGING FACE
OF LABOR 1983-2008, (2009), http://cepr.net/documents/publications/changing-face-of-labor2009-11.pdf.
153 AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS at 35.
154 AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS at 35–36.
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American Federation of Teachers, making up a large part of that force.156
The American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees has
also demonstrated significant growth, from 250,000 in the mid-1960s157 to
1.6 million in 2016.158 President Kennedy spurred the growth of federal
unions in 1963 when he signed Executive Order 10988, which allowed
public employees to engage in collective bargaining. Public sector unions
also vote at a much greater rate than other sectors in favor of union
certification.159
Although the legal environment in different states and changes in
different occupations impact this unequal relationship,160 there are likely
other forces at work leading to different unions being successful in certain
businesses. For one, it tends to be easiest to form unions where the
employees sought bear significant likeness in position, skill-level, location,
religion, or ethnicity.161 Associations that are formed around one
occupation are more likely to form and survive than those of more diverse
interests.162 Once one brings in a diverse population, the collective action
problem becomes much more severe. In some countries, for instance, the
union shop agreement is not the norm at all, but the exception. There,
however, it appears that in many instances unions are held together via
some other unionizing force such as religion—Catholic or anti-Catholic—or
ideology—Marxist, socialist.163
C.

Do Labor Unions Represent the Common Will of Its Membership?

In an article focused heavily on democracy, it is important to discuss
whether a union represents the interests of its members, through a
democratic process or otherwise. This raises the question again of
156

PETER L. FRANCIA, THE FUTURE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN AMERICAN POLITICS 55 (2006).
Id.
158 About
AFSCME, AM. FED’N OF STATE, CTY., AND MUN. EMPLOYEES,
http://www.afscme.org/union/about (last visited Oct. 5, 2017).
159 FRANCIA, supra note 156, at 56.
160 Dan Clawson & Mary Ann Clawson, What Has Happened to the US Labor Movement?
Union Decline and Renewal, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 95, 97–101 (1999).
161 WILSON, supra note 88, at 123; John Paul Ferguson, Racial Diversity and Union
Organizing in the United States, 1999–2008, 69 H.R. REV. 53, 55 (2016) (“[w]ork groups that win
union representation are less racially diverse than the population of work groups that initially
filed the election petitions”). Many have taken this basic fact to find that unions are antithetical
to civil rights. However, there is good social science evidence that unions can and have provided
important wins that foster civil rights, rather than hinder it. Charlotte Garden & Nancy Leong, So
Closely Intertwined: Labor and Racial Solidarity, 81 GEO WASH. L. REV. 1135, 1183–84 (2013).
162 WILSON, supra note 88, at 123; Shaun Bevan, Continuing the Collective Action Dilemma:
The Survival of Voluntary Associations in the United States, 66 POL. RES. Q. 545, 548, 553 (2013);
see also HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 22–23 (2000).
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whether it is possible to generate some common good of a group.
Whether unions represent the common interest of members or not
should at least implicate whether we think of them as advancing the cause
of democracy.
Not unlike the findings that our democracy is skewed towards
wealthier interests,164 within interest groups themselves, large patrons
tend to sway the view expressed of many nonprofit institutions.165
Business associations seem to show a strong tendency towards
representing the wealthiest interest among a group rather than the
median interest.166 I have not found evidence specifically demonstrating
that labor unions suffer from this problem. This may be because labor
unions tend to be very dependent upon the union dues model; they likely
are not able to use a significantly increasing sliding scale fee schedule in
the way that business associations tend to adopt. Labor unions directly
represent individuals rather than institutions.
Does this mean that the leaders of unions are more likely to
represent the individuals? While there are indications that unions, at
times, adopt relatively democratic means, the stronger evidence is that
leaders tend to diverge from the majority interest of union members, at
least in part. Of course, it may be more accurate to state that the labor
union members, like many people, are focused more on their own
economic situation than any outside politics.
Although I describe labor unions as interest groups, most members
do not join primarily for the interest group activities. They join because
the union negotiates contracts with management and protects employees
from unfair management actions.167 One study suggests job security is the
number one motivating factor for joining a union.168 As Professor Moe
states, union members “stress economic benefits, they place high value on
selective incentives, their membership is not contingent upon political
considerations, and their individual contributions have little political
impact.”169 This simple fact sets up an agency problem when union
leaders represent union members before government. The interests of
164

MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE & INFLUENCE 1, 1 (2012).
Jack L. Walker, The Origins and Maintenance of Interest Groups in America, 77 AM. POL.
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union leaders may not align with union members, and members may not
pay close attention to this fact. Remember though this is not unique to
labor unions. Business association leaders also diverge in representation
of members, although they diverge towards the wealthier interests.
Leaders of unions tend to diverge in beliefs from their members.
Leaders tend to believe strongly in the union as part of the labor
movement.170 In a study of members of Ohio unions, it was found that
while a plurality of members stated they belonged to the Democratic
Party, at the same time, the members believed approximately two-thirds
of leadership identified with the Democratic Party. 171 Anecdotal evidence
supports this divergence as well. A labor attorney, Thomas Geoghegan,
reports one union member expressing: “The guys who start out running
for Union office? Don’t trust them. They’re out for themselves.”172 The
union member suggests there are some good ones, but that most are
motivated by self-interest.
A fair amount of discussion of unions revolves around the question of
whether unions themselves are democratic. This question relates directly
to the question of whether the union somehow mirrors the will of those it
represents. In the 1950s, at the height of union power, Lipset, Trow, and
Coleman published a seminal study on union democracy by examining the
International Typographical Union—the only union at the time with a twoparty system.173 Lipset and coauthors were impressed with ITU’s
democracy. However, they ultimately found it unlikely that democracy
would prevail in most unions.174 They believed that large organizations
simply did not permit the pure democracy envisioned by theorists.175
Despite this critical assessment of the possibility of democracy within
unions, the authors still concluded that unions were important elements
of maintaining some level of democracy in a polyarchy.176
More modern studies have considered the same question and have
found the Lipset determination too constraining on the definition of
democracy and too pessimistic.177 They have found that many unions use
some important democratic features to make their decisions.
170
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Id.
172 THOMAS GEOGHEGAN, WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON? 183 (1992).
173 SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET ET AL., UNION DEMOCRACY: THE INSIDE POLITICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION (1956).
174 UNION DEMOCRACY, at 403.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 413.
177 Tom Langford, Union Democracy as a Foundation for a Participatory Society: A
Theoretical Elaboration and Historical Example, 76 LABOUR/LE TRAVAIL 79, 82–83 (2015).
171

MPP_HACKNEY

200x]

11/9/2017 5:46 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

135

Nevertheless, it is by no means clear that unions operate like the New
England town democracy of Robert Dahl. 178 As is to be expected, a small
group of individuals tend to make the decisions of these organizations and
that small group of leaders’ ideology likely differs in some part from a
large portion of the union’s membership. Nevertheless, labor union
members probably have more democratic rights than any other members
of a nonprofit organization because of the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act.179 That Act provides a Bill of Rights to union members
ensuring them democratic procedures in the operation of the union.
D.

Implications for a Model To Judge Political Voice Equality

I adopt the intrinsic equality principle as the basis of a model to
assess current policy. There is no one better than each individual to
decide for herself how her life should be governed. While many in our
society today think of one person, one vote as the defining principle of a
modern representative democracy, the intrinsic equality principle
demands more.180 A principle of one person, one political voice is more
descriptive of that ideal model. As we assess our U.S. system, we should
strive toward political voice equality. The key here is, in assessing political
fairness, we should be maximizing a social choice function rather than a
social welfare function. The question in political fairness is not whether a
person realized a particular governance decision outcome but whether
her political voice was respected as a part of the political process. This
model means that in evaluating the question of labor union tax policy we
should be less concerned about harmful or positive impacts on the
economy brought on by labor unions than we should be in whether labor
unions increase political voice equality.
Political voice equality in a small group would be relatively easy to
assess. We could use some process like Robert’s Rules of Order to ensure
everyone in the group had her voice respected in decision-making.
However, in a polyarchy the question of political voice equality becomes
much more difficult to determine.181 In part, political voice equality is
found in the exercise of the vote in free and fair elections to determine
representatives who will discuss and determine final policy for our polity.
However, elections don’t provide complete political voice opportunities.
178 See generally ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY
(2nd ed. 2005).
179 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401–531 (Sept.
14, 1959).
180 Schlozman, supra note 1, at 36.
181 See supra Part III.A, particularly notes 108–12.
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Citizens depend largely upon interest groups to fulfill that function. 182
Establishing an unbiased interest system is difficult because it is hard to
determine the different types of distinct interests in existence, who a
group is acting for, how effective any group might be at having its voice
heard, how representative of a group an interest group might be, and how
to determine what that interest system should look like over time.
Nevertheless, we have many guideposts that can help us make a
determination regarding political voice equality. For instance, collective
action theory provides a way of assessing which interests will face the
most severe collective action challenges. Additionally, extensive studies
illustrate the ebb and flow of the interest sector over time and we can
compare that to the total population. While these various theoretical and
empirical strategies do not allow us to be precise in any way in policy
choices, they do help to sketch out the broad outlines of a biased system.
That sketch should at least aid us in thinking about the public policy we
adopt so that we can try to build a policy that does not exacerbate the
bias of that system. We might even, under certain circumstances, work to
ameliorate that bias where the considered judgment of theory and
empirical evidence is that the bias is stark.
Thus, with labor unions, theory predicts labor interests will be
underrepresented in our democratic system. Theory also predicts many
wealthy business interests will not suffer such collective action problems
such that there will be a bias in the interest system of business as
compared to labor. The evidence suggests this bias is real, increasing, and
stark.183 We could look deeper to see if in fact policy preferences indeed
tilt away from the general interests of labor, but under the social choice
function model adopted here, there is no need to further assess that
matter. Based on the fact that labor is broadly left out of the political
discussion, particularly when compared with that of business, we could
embark on policy choices to change that reality.
IV. LABOR UNIONS: HISTORY AND TAX LAW
A.

Very Brief History

Labor associations in a sense have been a part of the U.S. since
before its inception. However, it is worthwhile making a distinction
between what some refer to as trade associations and trade unions. A
trade association, what I have referred to above as a business association
182
183

See supra Introduction, at 3.
See discussion in Part III.B.
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or business league, is typically made up of independent businessmen who
are trying to protect the price of the goods or services that they sell. 184
Trade unions, or what I am referring to here as labor unions, are made up
of wage earners who organize to earn a better wages, and better working
conditions for themselves.185 The former were around at the inception of
the U.S., while the latter begin in the late 1700s. 186 A society of
Philadelphia shoemakers in 1792 formed the first trade union in the
U.S.;187 it did not last a year. The early unions were made up of trades
such as cordwainers, printers, and tailors, and seemed to be associated
with a growing ability to mass produce goods.188
A major roadblock to forming trade unions at the time was that they
were generally illegal under U.S. law. For instance, New York cordwainers
were convicted of conspiracy to raise wages and operating a closed
shop.189 Journeymen tailors in Philadelphia were similarly convicted in
1827.190 In 1840, though, the Massachusetts Supreme Court found that it
was not illegal for laborers to so organize. This was a legal turning point
for labor.191
Realistically, the U.S. was largely made up of farmers at the time. 192
In 1820, farmers comprised 71.8% of our workforce.193 The growth of
labor unions appears to be connected to industrialization in the north.
Between 1860 and 1870, factory workers increased from 1.3 million to 2
million.194 For the first time, there were more factory workers than
farmhands.195 At this point, there were a total of 5.5 million non-farm
workers with a population of 35.2 million people in the country. 196 The
country’s first national labor union, called the National Labor Union, was
organized in 1866.197 Still, until the formation of the American Federation
of Labor (“AFL”) in 1886, national unionization efforts were neither
cohesive nor effective. 198 The signal success of the union organization
184

PHILIP TAFT, ORGANIZED LABOR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 3 (1964).
Id.
186 Id.; SIDNEY WEBB & BEATRICE WEBB, A HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM 1 (rev. ed., Longmans,
Green & Co., 1920).
187 Taft, supra note 184, at 5.
188 Id. at 3–5.
189 Id. at 10.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 11.
192 RUSSELL O. WRIGHT, CHRONOLOGY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2003).
193 Id.
194 PHILIP DRAY, THERE IS POWER IN A UNION: THE EPIC STORY OF LABOR IN AMERICA 71 (2010).
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id.at 75.
198 DAVID TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 4, 68 (Knopf ed. 1951).
185
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effort of the AFL was that it was based on organizing groups of skilled
individuals that had commonality and who were interested in protecting
their particular wage.199
Labor unions saw their greatest rise in the period between 1897 and
1904. During that time union membership increased from 477,000 to
2,072,000 members.200 This period also appears to be an apex of the fight
for the closed shop.201 Business associations and the government reacted
strongly to this effort and stemmed the tide starting in 1904 when
Theodore Roosevelt and the National Association of Manufacturers led
the effort against unions.202 Union membership rates then remained
relatively stable between 1935 and 1945.203 Not insignificantly, Congress
enacted the Wagner Act in 1935, making collective bargaining a policy of
the U.S.204 The Supreme Court found the Act constitutional in 1937.
Union membership increased by 57 percent that year.205 The Act gave
many protections to unions and included in its provisions the right to a
closed shop.
In the 1950s, union membership achieved its greatest membership in
relation to the workforce. 206 However, as discussed above in Part III,
union membership has had its most significant decline over the past 30
years. Many forces have played a role in this decline, including structural
changes in our economy, bad political instincts of labor union leaders,
aggressive employers successfully utilizing anti-union tactics, and even a
lessening of support among workers for unions. Nevertheless, scholars
have little agreement on the real cause. 207 This trend does seem to be
universal across nations, but the decline in the U.S. is particularly
significant.208
B.

Tax Exempt Requirements for Labor Unions

Congress exempted labor unions—“labor organization,” actually—
from tax first in the Tariff Act of 1909. 209 In its initial drafting, the Senate
Finance Committee did not include the phrase “labor organization,”
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209

Id.
COLLECTIVE ACTION, at 77.
Id. at 78.
Id.
Id. at 79.
Id.
Id.
UNHEAVENLY CHORUS, at 87.
Id. at 89.
Id. at 91.
Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 36 Stat. 11.
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because it believed the idea was covered by “fraternal beneficiary
societies . . . operating under the lodge system, and providing for the
payment of life, sick, accident, and other benefits.”210 After labor unions
complained, however, Congress added the phrase “labor organization” to
the statute.211 Others argue that labor unions were worried that the
taxation of insurance companies would ensure that labor unions that
engaged in some insurance activities would be subject to tax under the
Code.212 Congress maintained the exemption of labor unions in the 1913
Income Tax Act and additionally added the terms we know today of labor,
agricultural, and horticultural organizations.213 I focus only on the labor
portion of the statute. Agricultural and horticultural organizations bear
much more in common with trade associations exempt under section
501(c)(6) of the Code. 214
To qualify under section 501(c)(5), a labor union: (1) may not allow its
earnings to inure to the benefit of its members, and (2) must “have as [its]
objects the betterment of the conditions of those engaged in such
pursuits, the improvement of the grade of their products, and the
development of a higher degree of efficiency in their respective
occupations.”215 A labor union must serve individuals who are considered
to be “labor.”216 Thus, for instance, an organization of “drivers, trainers,
and horse owners, most of whom are independent contractors or
entrepreneurs,” did “not qualify for exemption as a labor [union].”217
Courts have interpreted the term “labor organization” liberally to
ensure the protection of labor interests.218 In that vein, the IRS found an
apprenticeship committee organized primarily to establish standards in
skilled crafts, determine the qualifications necessary to become a
journeyman, and aid in adjusting and settling disputes between the
employer and the apprentice, qualified as a labor union.219

210

44 Cong.Rec. 4154–55 (1909).
See, e.g., 44 CONG. REC. 4154 (1909); 44 CONG. REC. 4155 (1909).
212 James J. McGovern, The Exemption Provisions of Subchapter F, 29 TAX LAW. 523, 530–31
(1976) (citing 44 CONG. REC. 4149, 4154, 4155 (1909)).
213 Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(G), 38 Stat. 172.
214 Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 23, at 353 n. 148.
215 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(5)-1(a).
216 Rev. Rul. 76-420, 1976-2 C.B. 153 (1976).
217 Rev. Rul. 78-288, 1978-2 C.B. 179 (1978). See also Rev. Rul. 74-167, 1974-1 C.B. 134
(1974) (“[I]nclusion of some self-employed persons in the membership of a qualified labor
[union] does not affect the organization's exempt status.”).
218 Portland Coop. Labor Temple Ass’n v. Comm’r, 39 B.T.A. 450 (1939).
219 Rev. Rul. 59-6, 1959-1 C.B. 121 (1959).
211
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Typical exempt activities of a labor union include collective
bargaining,220 publishing labor newspapers,221 allocating work assignments
among union members,222 and providing litigation support to controlling
unions.223 A teacher’s association that “sponsors seminars and courses for
its members, participates in teacher conventions, bargains collectively and
processes grievances, and keeps its members informed of its activities
through regular meetings and a newsletter,” qualifies as a labor union.224
Under IRS guidance, a union can maintain a pension plan and qualify
as a labor union.225 While IRS guidance prohibits a pension plan to qualify
as a labor union by itself, there is a circuit split on the issue. The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that a pension plan managed jointly by
an employer and a union qualifies as an exempt labor union. 226 The D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals, however, agreed with the IRS that a foreign
pension fund similarly controlled by an employer and a union did not
qualify.227 The court reasoned that the pension fund was neither
controlled by nor represented traditional labor unions.
A labor union may not operate a business as an exempt purpose even
if the business is there to solely employ members and turn over all profits
to the labor union. 228 Similarly, an organization controlled by private
individuals that offers strike insurance does not qualify under section
501(c)(5).229 Providing ministerial services for labor unions, such as

220 Rev. Rul. 77-154, 1977-1 C.B. 148 (1977) (nurses’ association “whose primary activity is
acting as a collective bargaining agent for its members qualifies . . . .”).
221 Rev. Rul. 68-534, 1968-2 C.B. 217 (1968) (labor union that publishes a newspaper
providing information on union activity is performing an exempt function); S.M. 2558, III-2 C.B.
207.
222 Rev. Rul. 75-473, 1975-2 C.B. 213 (“organization, controlled and funded jointly by a
labor union and an employer association, that operates a dispatch hall to allocate work
assignments among union members and engages in other activities appropriate to a labor union
qualifies . . . .”).
223 Rev. Rul. 74-596, 1974-2 C.B. 167 (organization that provides supporting litigation
activities, proper for any one of its member unions, directed to the betterment of conditions for
public employees qualifies).
224 Rev. Rul. 76-31, 1976-1 C.B. 157 .
225 Rev. Rul. 62-17, 1962-1 C.B. 87.
226 Morganbesser v. United States, 984 F.2d 560, 563–64 (1993).
227 Stichting Pensioenfonds Voor de Gezondheid, Geestelijke en Maatschappelijke
Belangen (PGGM) v. United States, 129 F.3d 195, 200 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 811
(1998); see also Tupper v. United States, 134 F.3d 444, 444–45 (1st Cir. 1998) (finding that a
pension plan controlled by an employer and a union did not qualify for exemption as a labor
union).
228 Rev. Rul. 69-386, 1969-2 C.B. 123.
229 Rev. Rul. 76-420, 1976-2 C.B. 153; cf. Rev. Rul. 67-7, 1967-1 C.B. 137 (organization
established by a labor union to provide strike and lockout benefits to its members is a labor
union).
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creating an organization holding employment taxes,230 or establishing
savings accounts231 for union members, are not validly exempt labor union
activities.
The tax law does not impose significant restrictions or disclosure on
labor unions. However, labor law places significant restrictions and
disclosure obligations that treat labor unions worse in many ways that
business associations are treated. Under tax law, labor unions may lobby
before legislative bodies.232 Like social welfare organizations and business
leagues, tax law does not require labor unions to publicly disclose its
donors.233 However, the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
requires labor unions to disclose all sources of income in excess of
$5,000.234 Under tax law, a labor union may intervene in a political
campaign as long as it does not become a primary activity. 235 Federal
election law, though, prohibits a labor union from spending its treasury
funds on such political campaigns.236 A labor union might owe a tax under
section 527(f) for any expenditures it makes on political campaign
activity.237 To avoid this tax and comply with federal election law, the
union can set up a segregated fund that is effectively a Political Action
Committee under section 527. 238
Most unions must file a Form 990 disclosing information regarding its
financial activities.239 The Form 990 is disclosed publicly. Nevertheless,
because labor unions must disclose so much to the Department of Labor,
such as its donors, and to the FEC, the Form 990 information is probably
less important for the public than that form is for organizations like
charities or even business
associations.
230

Rev. Rul. 66-354, 1966-2 C.B. 207.
Rev. Rul. 77-46, 1977-1 C.B. 147.
232 Rev. Rul. 2004-6, 2004-1 C.B. 328.
233 A labor union must file a Form 990 and attach a schedule B, Schedule of Contributors.
That schedule requires a labor union to disclose its substantial donors, who are typically those
who donate more than $5,000. However, unlike the Form 990, which is publicly disclosed, the
IRS does not publicly disclose labor union schedule B.
234 29 U.S.C. § 431. You can find extensive reports about the financial activities of labor
unions at the website of the Department of Labor here: https://olms.dolesa.gov/query/getOrgQry.do.
235 John Francis Reilly & Barbara A. Braig Allen, Political Campaign and Lobbying Activities
of IRC 501(c)(4), (c)(5), and (c)(6) Organizations, IRS Continuing Professional Education Article, L1, L-2 (2003), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicl03.pdf; Cf. 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(5)-1
(2017) (fails to list intervening in a political campaign as a valid purpose of a labor organization).
236 11 C.F.R. § 114.4 (2017).
237 26 U.S.C.A. § 527 (West 2014).
238 Reilly, supra note 235, at L-6.
239 26 U.S.C. § 6033.
231
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As discussed in Part I above, the exemption from tax in the case of
labor unions is generally more a matter of deferral, rather than of
complete exemption. While there is no charitable contribution deduction
for union dues, dues are deductible under section 162 as a business
expense. Nevertheless, in many instances union members may not be
able to deduct this expense. A union member in most instances is
restricted in deducting dues because dues are an itemized deduction and
also a miscellaneous itemized deduction subject to the two percent
floor.240
V.

RATIONALES FOR TAX EXEMPTION

Few scholars have considered the rationale for labor union tax
exemption. One author suggests that the exemption of labor unions may
have been built upon a principle of nondiscrimination.241 After choosing
to exempt trade associations, Congress may have felt compelled to
provide a similar exemption to labor as well.242 The general sense though
is that exemption for labor unions is a divergence from normal tax law,
such that to the extent there is income earned in the labor union that is
not taxed, it is a subsidy to the union and its members. That subsidy may
not be large, and is likely of a deferral nature, but it is still a divergence
from income tax law.
The earliest consideration of labor union tax exemption appears to
be by Neale M. Albert and Sanford I. Hansell, who expressed concern
about providing a subsidy to an entity that was becoming particularly
powerful and might cause harm to the economy.243 They found that labor
unions seemed to generally deserve exemption as a legal matter, at least
under the system established by Congress. However, they thought the
power of labor was beginning to threaten our system of free enterprise
and skew the labor versus capital collective bargaining arrangement.
Thus, they thought that Congress should consider limiting the tax
favorability of the labor union tax system. Although they thought taxing a
union on union dues payments inequitable, they thought taxing either
investment income broadly, or dividends more narrowly, could be
supported.244

240
241

Halperin, supra note 26, at 163.; see Bittker, supra note 23, at 307.
James J. McGovern, The Exemption Provisions of Subchapter F, 29 TAX LAW. 523, 531

(1976).
242

Id.
Neal M. Albert & Sanford I. Hansell, The Tax Status of the Modern Labor Union, 111 U.
PA. L. REV. 137, 153 (1962).
244 Id. at 160.
243
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Lawrence Stone also found that labor unions should not be exempt
from tax.245 Stone suggested that while we may not miss the right
normative tax result by too much, it probably would be easier to handle
some thorny issues of taxation of these organizations under a cooperative
model instead. 246 David Miller more recently agreed with this basic
assessment, and argued we should tax labor unions just like we tax social
clubs: tax investment income and non-member income.247
George Rahdert and Boris Bittker cursorily considered the rationale
for labor unions.248 As a mutual benefit organization, established to
support their members, they believed that any income earned by the
organization should be allocated to the members and then taxed to
them.249 They seemed little bothered by labor union tax exemption
because almost all expenses of a labor union would be deductible to union
members; the primary benefit of tax exemption would be a matter of
deferral.250
Halperin generally reviewed the exemption of mutual benefit
organizations and found that in the context of business related nonprofits,
tax exemption provided a deferral benefit that should probably be
eliminated.251 He believed that elimination should extend to labor unions
even though they presented a more sympathetic claim for exemption.252
He does not think the amount of money is substantial because of the fact
that almost all the money spent by a labor union would be a deductible
amount, again noting like others that the tax issue is mostly a matter of
deferral rather than complete avoidance.
The above approaches tend to focus on whether labor unions should
be taxed based on whether the activity generates taxable income or not.
A couple of economists have approached the rationale of tax exemption
from an economic efficiency point of view. These analyses generally
assume that tax exemption provides a subsidy
Although neither has spoken directly on the issue of tax exemption
for labor unions, their thought is instructive in thinking about the

245

Lawrence M. Stone, Federal Tax Support of Charities and Other Exempt Organizations:
The Need for a National Policy, 20 U. SO. CAL. TAX INST. 27 (1968).
246 Id. at 58–60.
247 David S. Miller, Reforming the Taxation of Exempt Organizations and Their Patrons, 67
TAX LAWYER 451, 452 (2014).
248 Bittker, supra note 23, at 354–55.
249 Bittker supra, note 23, at 306.
250 Id. at 354.
251 Daniel Halperin, The Income Taxation of Mutual Nonprofits, 59 TAX L. REV. 133, 166
(2006).
252 Id. at 163.
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question. Henry Hansmann argues that the nonprofit sector tends to
provide goods that are undersupplied because of contract failure. 253
Burton Weisbrod argued that we should not only expect underinvestment in collective goods by the private sector, but that we should
also expect underinvestment from the public sector, and government as
well.254 For both Hansmann and Weisbrod, tax exemption is one possible,
if flawed, way of remedying the undersupply of these identified goods.
Collective goods—sometimes called public goods—consist of those goods
or services that once provided to one, cannot be excluded from any. 255
Weisbrod developed a simplistic model of a society with a private forprofit sector and a public governmental sector.256 He assumes that in any
society, for-profit firms will tend to provide a certain amount of private
goods. The government, in turn, will provide a certain amount of
collective goods.257 Weisbrod assumes, though, that the government will
never provide an optimal level of collective goods; it will only provide the
level desired by the median voter. Although private firms may provide
some private goods that are collective good substitutes, they will never be
sufficient.258 He argues that public subsidy of voluntary behavior can work
to supply collective goods that meet the needs of the non-median
voter.259 This theory is typically referred to as the government failure
theory.
Hansmann focuses on market failure. He argues that nonprofit firms
are likely the most efficient provider of certain goods and services subject
to significant contract failure.260 By contract failure, he means those
goods or services whose provision does not happen at an optimal level
because of some market failure, such as asymmetric information. For
instance, the provision of goods or services to poor people on behalf of
donors is subject to substantial contract failure because the purchaser—
the donor—cannot easily confirm that the goods or services are delivered
to the poor person. Thus, we should expect fewer donations than is
253

Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate
Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 67–9 (1981).
254 See generally Burton A. Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of The Voluntary Non-Profit Sector
in a Three-Sector Economy (March 3–4, 1972) (Institute for Research on Poverty, Discussion
Papers).
255 COLLECTIVE ACTION, at 14–15.
256 Weisbrod, at 27.
257 Weisbrod, at 23.
258 Weisbod, at 11.
259 Weisbrod, at 30–32. See also John R. Brooks, Quasi-Public Spending, 104 GEO. L.J. 1057,
1078 n. 87 (2016) (discussing the nature of public goods, collective goods, and private goods,
and the lack of a clear cut definition between these items).
260 Hansmann, supra note 253, at 70.
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optimal. Nonprofit firms, he suggests, are the most efficient providers in
such contract failure situations.261 Finally, the subsidy is well matched to
nonprofit needs because nonprofits do not have access to equity markets
and tax exemption helps ease that burden. 262
Hansmann does not claim that this rationale is a strong one, only a
sufficient one. 263 He believes that, on economic efficiency grounds, we
should be slightly better off with the capital subsidy of tax exemption. 264
Hansmann suggests that a useful method for assessing whether nonprofits
make more sense within an industry is to observe whether there is a forprofit counterpart in that industry. That there is a large for-profit
contingent in the industry is evidence that the nonprofit firm may not be
the most efficient provider of the service or good. However, it is not
conclusive evidence.
While Hansmann does not apply his theory to labor unions, he does
consider its application to mutual nonprofits generally. He argues that
social clubs, such as country clubs, likely do not face capital formation
challenges.265 Country clubs and other such organizations are easily able
to attract the funds they need for their operations. He also believes they
do not really suffer from a contract failure. It is not clear how Hansmann
would apply his analysis to labor unions. I will turn to this in my analysis
towards the conclusion of the Article.
In a political justification, some, including justices of the U.S.
Supreme Court, have argued that nonprofits foster pluralism.266 There is a
strong traditional sense that the nonprofit sector is a place for
experimentation and the generation and dissemination of ideas that are
critical to a healthy democracy. This American love of voluntary
associations fulfilling this deeply democratic purpose was noticed by
Alexis de Toqueville who wrote with admiration of the American tendency
to form associations to accomplish all sorts of objects that might typically
have been left to the government. 267
261

Hansmann, supra note 253, at 74.
Hansmann, supra note 253, at 74.
263 Hansmann, supra note 253, at 75.
264 Hansmann, supra note 253, at 92.
265 Hansmann, supra note 253, at 94.
266 BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 1.4 (9th ed. 2007); Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 609–10 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring) (describing the “role
played by tax exemptions in encouraging diverse, indeed often sharply conflicting, activities and
viewpoints”); see also LESTER M. SALAMON, AMERICA’S NONPROFIT SECTOR: A PRIMER 14 (2d ed. 1999);
John W. Gardner, The Independent Sector, in AMERICA’S VOLUNTARY SPIRIT ix, xiii–xv (Brian
O’Connell ed. 1983); Elizabeth T. Boris & Matthew Maronick, Civic Participation and Advocacy, in
THE STATE OF NONPROFIT AMERICA 394 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2nd ed. 2012).
267 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Gerald E. Bevan trans., Peguin Books 2003).
262
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There are scholars who generally support a vibrant voluntary
nonprofit sector. Some, like Theda Scokpol, believe that nonprofits of a
voluntary membership nature serve an important democratic-enhancing
role.268 Her work documents that through the 1950s, the U.S. was
supported by cross-class voluntary associations that tended to make the
U.S. a more democratic nation.269 However, since the 1960s, these crossclass voluntary associations have greatly diminished in favor of
professionally-run associations supported by the money of elites and
private foundations.270 This has resulted in a crowding out of the issues of
middle class and poor citizens, she suggests.271 Her work might also
support policy directed towards the government providing an
enhancement towards nonprofit organizations.
I have argued in the past that to determine whether a nonprofit
should be exempt from the corporate income tax, we need a theory for
why we would apply the income tax to a nonprofit corporation in the first
place.272 In order to find that there is any subsidy to the nonprofit, we
must believe that a tax should apply to the entity. There are only two
likely theories to support the taxation of nonprofits: (1) the shareholder
theory, and (2) the real entity/regulatory theory. Neither theory provides
significant support for taxing charitable organizations as currently
constructed. However, both theories generally support applying a tax to
mutual benefit organizations. In terms of other tax exempt interest
groups, I previously argued that trade associations do not suffer
substantial market failure, and are therefore undeserving of a subsidy.273
In that article, I left open the possibility that labor unions might be
deserving of the subsidy. In the next part, I turn to analyze that matter.
VI. ANALYSIS: LABOR UNION TAX TREATMENT ASSESSED UNDER A POLITICAL
FAIRNESS MODEL
In addition to economic fairness and efficiency, we should consider
the value of democracy and, particularly, political voice equality in
assessing our income tax policy. Generally, political fairness should only
be one of many factors that should be considered in an evaluation of tax
policy. On most matters of the definition of income, for instance, political
268 Theda Skocpol, Diminished Democracy: From Membership to Management in American
Civic Life 12 (2003).
269 THEDA SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY (2003).
270 DIMINISHED, at Chapter 6.
271 DIMINISHED, at 238–39.
272 Philip T. Hackney, What We Talk About When We Talk About Tax Exemption, 33 VA. TAX
L. REV. 115, 187–88 (2013).
273 Taxing the Unheavenly, supra note 16, at 267.
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voice equality should likely play a very limited role. It should play a
greater role in a consideration of how much progressivity to adopt, as well
as the proper rate of tax. However, where tax policy directly impacts
political voice equality, it should be a major factor in the assessment. The
principle of intrinsic equality should not be overridden by principles of
economic fairness or economic efficiency in these circumstances.
Furthermore, we should consider ending any tax policy that directly
exacerbates political voice inequality.
By “directly impacts political voice equality,” I mean a tax policy that
immediately applies to an organization’s or an individual’s expression of
political voice in our democracy. Thus, on one hand, the deduction of
payments or receipts to or from political groups, or the taxation of the
income of political groups, directly impacts political voice equality.
Partnership taxation, on the other hand, would generally not directly
impact political voice equality.
The taxation of interest group activity directly impacts political voice.
Whether you look at the taxation of an individual’s payments or receipts
to or from an interest group, or the taxation of the interest group itself,
the choice will either encourage or discourage the activity of exercising
political voice. Thus, on the issue of tax exemption for nonprofits
generally, and taxation impacting labor unions specifically, I believe we
should consider the important value of political voice equality.
In assessing the deductibility of labor union dues and the propriety of
labor union tax exemption, there are two primary questions—one
descriptive and one normative: (1) does income tax policy incentivize the
formation and maintenance of labor unions, and (2) should tax policy
incentivize the formation and maintenance of labor unions? The second
question can be broken into three branches: (a) in isolation, should we
incentivize labor unions; (b) if all other political interest groups are
similarly incentivized, should labor unions receive that incentive also; and,
finally, (c) should we incentivize some interests more than others?
On the first question, as I discuss more below, we likely penalize the
formation and maintenance of labor unions. As to the second question,
tax policy should at least be neutral as to the matter of interest groups,
and could be structured to provide additional incentives to labor unions.
This means that if all other groups are provided exemption for the
organization and deduction for dues payments, labor unions and their
members should be extended the same treatment. However, political
fairness would be enhanced by eliminating tax exemption for all interest
groups and extending the deductibility of dues above the line to labor
union members. Finally, although there are problems with the final case,
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we could justify eliminating tax exemption for business interests while
extending it to labor interests. 274
A.

Does Income Tax Policy Incentivize Labor Union Activity?

Tax exemption for labor unions and the deductibility of labor union
dues appear to be the only two tax policies that might directly impact
labor interests in formation and maintenance. As developed in Part I, it
appears that tax exemption provides a modest subsidy, but that the
deduction of union dues leads to something of a penalty to the payment
of union dues.
The government provides a small subsidy to labor unions through tax
exemption based primarily on deferral of amounts that would be
deductible in a future year. 275 Although small, this subsidy is likely
enhanced by other state and local tax benefits like property tax exemption
that often flow from obtaining tax exempt status. 276 Still, the benefit
appears to be available only sporadically to the most successful labor
unions. I say “sporadically” because unions likely rarely experience
profits; it is likely that only larger unions are either able to sell products
like insurance to its members and nonmembers to generate profits, or are
able to actually earn investment income. As tax exemption is constructed,
the subsidy is unlikely to ever reach those interests that face the most
severe collective action challenges because they never organize.
As for the deductibility of union dues, we penalize the payment of
union dues rather than subsidize it. The normal income tax policy
provides that the association dues one pays for one’s job are deductible
from income. Union dues are technically deductible under the Code as a
business expense.277 However, our income tax treats union dues
payments to the worst possible treatment, a miscellaneous itemized
deduction.278 This means that the union member is only able to deduct
union dues to the extent he has already paid other miscellaneous itemized
deductions that exceed two percent of his adjusted gross income. Given
that in a normal income tax we would allow the deduction of union dues,
to primarily deny the deduction is in effect to penalize the activity. In
274

I do not address here how to think about interest groups that are social welfare
organizations or charitable organizations. The political fairness analysis constructed here based
on collective action challenges is not as immediately applicable to an organization that is
generally bankrolled by some wealthy individual. I hope to turn to this challenge in a later paper.
275 26 U.S.C.A. § 162 (West 2014).
276 Bazil Facchina et al., Privileges & Exemptions Enjoyed by Nonprofit Organizations, 28 U.
S.F. L. REV. 85, 104–05 (1993–1994).
277 26 U.S.C.A. § 162 (West 2014).
278 26 U.S.C. § 67; 26 U.S.C. § 1.67-1T(a)(1)(i).
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fairness, Congress adopted a generous standard deduction to eliminate
the need of people to deduct many expenses such as union dues.279
However, the fact that union dues are considered a miscellaneous
itemized deduction further penalizes the activity. Nevertheless, the result
of this policy is that we do not incentivize the payment of union dues, and
could be thought to penalize the payment of union dues. Admittedly, this
is a problem of unreimbursed employee business expenses, a policy
Congress adopted likely to stop employees from trying to take unjustified
expenses, but union dues would seem to be well outside the type of
payment that might be abused.
The severe limitation on the deduction of union dues may very well
cancel out any subsidy given to labor unions through tax exemption. A
laborer would be better off paying a mortgage and property taxes on his
house or making a charitable contribution 280 than paying union dues. This
means that rather than subsidizing the formation of labor unions, we
discourage the joining of labor unions and maintaining union membership.
The comparison of the labor interest tax treatment to the business
interest tax treatment is instructive too. A businessman who wants to join
a trade association will often be able to deduct the trade association
amount above the line, thus guaranteeing the deduction in a large
percentage of circumstances.281 Thus, we generally encourage the joining
of business interest groups.
This comparison point is important in the tax exemption sense as
well. We provide business interests the same tax exemption opportunity
we provide to labor interests. Because the models of business interests
can differ greatly from the labor interest, it is likely that business interests
can make much better use of the tax exemption per capita. Unions
primarily generate money from member dues. Those dues are not going
to differ wildly in amount. Business interests though often charge sliding
scale fees that allow them to generate particularly big contributions from
wealthy members. Additionally, they can sell various products such as
industry codes that allow them significant opportunities for profit. The
American Medical Association for instance controls and sells the very

279

John R. Brooks, Doing Too Much: The Standard Deduction and the Conflict Between
Progressivity and Simplification, 2 COLUM. J. TAX. L. 203, 205 (2011).
280 26 U.S.C. § 67 treats interest deductions and charitable contribution deductions as
itemized deductions, rather than miscellaneous itemized deductions.
281 With many business interests being either entities or employers or small businessmen
their right to deduct is found in 26 U.S.C. § 62, meaning they are ensured the deduction from
gross income.
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profitable codes for medical billing associated with Medicare. 282 This
means business interest’s members are not penalized for making
contributions to a trade association, and that business interests
themselves are likely able to generate a larger more regular benefit from
tax exemption. Thus, we incentivize business interests to form interest
groups more than we do labor interests.
B.

Should Tax Policy Incentivize Labor Union Activity?

That brings us to the second question. Should we use income tax
policy to incentivize the formation and maintenance of labor unions? This
question has three subquestions: (i) in isolation, should we incentivize
labor unions, (ii) if we are incentivizing other interest groups, should we
incentivize labor interests too, and (iii) would we be better off with a
neutral system where all interest groups face the same level of taxation or
should, and can, we build a system where some interests are incentivized
over others? In each instance, tax exemption is considered first, and then
the case of the deductibility of union dues.
1.

Labor Union Incentives in Isolation

Labor union revenue appears to bear all the characteristics of taxable
income. A union is a separately recognized, independent entity that
carries on an activity that would be taxed like any other business. While
some have argued that charitable organizations do not earn income in the
sense we think of income within the income tax, 283 no one makes that
claim as to a labor union. Thus, in absence of some good rationale, labor
union income should generally be taxed. None of the current theories of
tax exemption provide a strong case to support tax exemption for labor
unions, or labor interests generally.
We could approach the question of whether a labor union deserves
income tax exemption from an economic efficiency perspective. The best
support for such a case in nonprofit tax exemption rationales is likely
Hansmann’s contract failure theory based in an economic efficiency
rationale. Labor interests face a contract failure because of the collective
action problem common to large groups where the return from joining is
relatively small compared to the cost of joining. Additionally, labor unions
are created in the nonprofit form such that they undergo some capital
constraints. However, along with the fact that Hansmann’s theory
282 Taxing the Unheavenly, supra note 16, at 321 (discussing the AMA’s sale of Current
Procedural Technology code (CPT Code) that determines how any medical procedure is
reimbursed by Medicare).
283 See, e.g., Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 23, at 307–14, 333.
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provides no real limiting principle,284 many explicitly make the case that
labor unions are harmful in an economic efficiency sense. 285 We could get
into a battle over the economic efficiency impact of labor unions, but I
believe there is a more satisfying rationale, if we consider the political
fairness of the matter.
Weisbrod’s government failure theory has some promise too.
Perhaps labor union services are services that the government does not
provide, but are something a group of our society who are not a majority
desires. This is not a perfect fit either. Labor unions are not an end good
that might be provided by government, but more of a government process
in and of itself. Even if we could find that labor unions provide a good that
the government fails to provide, this theory offers no reason for why we
should believe this good should be supported by government. Again,
considering the situation from the political fairness angle should offer
some greater support.
Perhaps we could try to build a case for labor unions based on a quid
pro quo theory that labor unions provide some concrete economic
benefits to society. The difficulty with this path is that there is evidence
on the outcomes of unions on our society that point in different
directions. Some say unions help in growth and in protecting laborers,
while others find that they harm our economy while protecting only a
select few laborers.
Finally, there may be something in the pluralist argument. Nonprofit
organizations enhance the number of voices we find in our political
system, and thereby improve the deliberations of our representative
bodies by increasing the amount of political voices. However, the claim of
pluralism has never been deeply developed.
The pluralist argument is based on a facile model of group-based
democracy.286 This vision of pluralism suggests we encourage every
interest to form to bring all possible voices to the government. However,
that case ignores the collective action problem. Interests face varying
levels of difficulty in organizing and maintaining status and action. This
means the provision of a subsidy through exemption will likely never go to
the groups that arguably need it the most. The pluralist rationale also
ignores a lesser but important factor—whether groups represent the
“true” interests of the group members. Both theoretical and empirical
284

Cf. Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 2017,
2066–67 (2007) (arguing for-profit organizations deserve a subsidy for carrying out charitable
works just like nonprofit organizations).
285 See supra note 2.
286 Taxing the Unheavenly, supra note 16, at 270–72.

HACKNEY PROP UP HEAVENLY DRAFT 11917

152

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

11/9/2017 5:46 PM

[Vol. XX:nn

scholarship have shown that it is unlikely that groups fulfill this role in a
way we might hope. Those who argue that we should support the entire
nonprofit sector with tax exemption because it will enhance “pluralism”
fail to acknowledge these deep imperfections.
Nevertheless, although the nonprofit pluralists are misguided in part,
their instincts are right. Much of our nonprofit sector plays a significant
role in our democratic structure. Social welfare organizations, labor
unions, and business leagues are all arguably primarily involved in shaping
our democracy as interest groups.287 Because of issues of numerosity,
individual citizens are rarely able to participate in setting the agenda in
our democracy of items for final votes. As discussed above, interest
groups tend to fill this important democratic role on behalf of citizens.
Thus, getting policy right regarding these nonprofit organizations might be
less about economic efficiency, and more about getting democracy right. I
argue we should consider a neo-pluralist case for supporting interest
groups through tax exemption.
A major assumption of this case is that we should strive for
democracy rather than anarchy or guardianship. While this assumption
may seem self-evident, it is anything but. Founding fathers, such as
Madison and Hamilton, were deeply drawn to some form of guardianship
as the best form of government. The Founders were particularly fearful of
the laborers and farmers exercising majoritarian power, and tried to
design our system of representation to ensure mostly only “qualified
individuals” represented our people. This is ultimately what Federalist 10
is about. Many continue to distrust the poor and working class to
participate in governing our democracy. This is seen in efforts to limit
voting rights to arguments that voters are not educated well enough to
vote. Additionally, while we may not think of the U.S. as a strong bastion
of anarchism, there is a strong libertarian streak in this country that
argues for as limited a government as possible. That libertarian streak is
well expressed in those who would like to see the market control most
matters of distribution of goods and services. If you support either of
these cases, you are unlikely to agree with my case.
However, if you believe in the principle of intrinsic equality discussed
in Part II—that most adults have more right to govern themselves than
anyone else—then you should also generally believe in the case for
democracy. Accepting the principle of intrinsic equality comes with a
corollary that each of us should have a right to participate in the
governance of our group affairs. Such a belief could lead to the idealistic
287

Charitable organizations do too, but do not typically do so in a primary sense.
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notion of pure democracy. Under that system, to be true to the principle
of intrinsic equality we would need to ensure that everyone impacted by a
group decision had the right to help set the agenda of the group, receive
information about the issues before the group, help to provide
information about the decisions before the group, and have a right to vote
on all final decisions. Obviously, as discussed in Parts II and III, we know
the world has never seen a pure democracy, and there are reasons to
believe it is unrealistic.
Still, not all is lost for democracy. As discussed in Part III, our notion
of a democracy is generally a polyarchy where certain critical rights such
as freedom of speech, association, and the right to regular free and fair
elections have become what we expect from democracy. Factors such as
size of the country or population, and differences in wealth or ability, all
create significant obstacles to pure democracy, but also to a polyarchy.
Ensuring equal political voice becomes almost an impossibility under these
circumstances. But this does not mean we should not strive for more
political voice equality in our democracy.
While groups are far from the perfect answer to this inequality, it
seems at least that they are a part of a solution. For many people, groups
provide their only real opportunity to have a seat at the agenda setting
table. And, the evidence is strong that labor interests are significantly
underrepresented.288 Laborers mostly do not have a seat at the agend
setting table. Blue-collar workers and the poor are thoroughly outgunned
in the interest group sector by the interests of executives and
management and business generally.289 As demonstrated in Part III A, this
is true whether we look at interest group numbers, congressional hearing
testimony, or money spent on lobbying.
Whether this representation identifies a disparity in result, is beside
the point. The political fairness model I propose focuses on maximizing a
social choice function, rather than a social welfare function. In a
democracy, we should strive to ensure actual representation at the table
of government. Labor is not at the table. Under these circumstances, it is
reasonable and just to ensure that our tax system is not operated in a way
to hinder the formation of labor interests. Given the enormous disparity
in representation, it also seems reasonable and just to try to subsidize
such interests through the tax system.
Following this idea to its logical extreme might be unworkable
though. To push the idea further, where a distinct political interest faces

288
289

See supra Part III.
See supra Part III.B.

HACKNEY PROP UP HEAVENLY DRAFT 11917

154

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

11/9/2017 5:46 PM

[Vol. XX:nn

substantial collective action problems, we could strive to aid those
interests to organize and maintain interest groups based on some sliding
scale of collective action difficulty. The principle though is neither
practical nor administrable. It suggests that Congress or an agency should
assess the relative collective action challenge an interest faces before
providing a subsidy. Depending on the size of the group, the education of
interested parties, and the capital resources available, we might ratchet
up and down some scale that the subsidy provided. We could even
conceivably impose a tax on the activity of interests that face no collective
action problem to hinder particularly powerful interests.
Adopting such a detailed system is likely to be less than optimal when
administrability, complexity, and political matters are considered. In
assessing an optimal commodity taxation system where tax rose and fell
based on the relative elasticity of goods, Professor Eric Zolt concluded that
such a system would have too many informational demands, too much
added complexity, and likely political problems.290 A subsidy based on the
relative collective action problem of interests would face similar problems.
Given these constraints, if we wanted to build such a system, we are
probably better off making calls based on rough justice regarding broad
categories of groups, as Congress has in effect already done.
If we look at labor union tax exemption in isolation, under a rough
justice, neo-pluralist view, the case for tax exemption for unions seems at
first glance, strong. Given that labor interests suffer a significant collective
action problem and are poorly represented in the interest group ecosystem, there would seem to be good reason to try to enhance their
ability to organize and maintain a union. However, if we are in fact
looking at labor interests in isolation, that is, not taking into consideration
other interests such as business interests, we might find a more troubling
picture. The subsidy of tax exemption is not targeted towards the
interests that need it the most. We would assist from year-to-year a very
narrow sector of the labor market. Even with the exemption, unions will
likely be a highly selective group of employees that happen to be in
sectors of the economy or country that are more conducive to unions than
others. While it may help some inchoate unions to organize and then
maintain status, it probably works to provide greater aid to those
organizations that were more likely to organize in the first place anyway.
Thus, standing in isolation without considering the role of other groups in
our democracy and the incentives provided to them, it is hard to say one
way or the other whether a subsidy should be provided to labor unions
290

Eric M. Zolt, The Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation, 16 VA. TAX REV. 39, 66–67 (1996).

MPP_HACKNEY

200x]

11/9/2017 5:46 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

155

alone. I return to this question again in the final part of the analysis in
considering whether we should provide the subsidy to labor when we take
the subsidy away from buiness interests.
What about the case for allowing the deductibility of union dues?
Because the basic income tax case for deductibility of union dues is so
strong, it’s hard to imagine another justification. However, given that
union dues relate directly to political voice equality denying the deduction
should be expected to cause significant political unfairness. That
inequality deepens when we recognize that laborers face significant
collective action problems in organizing to protect their interests. The
neo-pluralist case, thus, strongly backs up the case to provide a deduction
for this expenditure. Perhaps, the ability to deduct does not give a tax
benefit to all who we might like; however, it would seem odd to deny such
a group of people this deduction.
2.

Exemption to Unions When Other Interests Are Extended Exemption

In a world where other interests are subsidized through tax
exemption—this describes current tax policy—the case for providing a
similar tax exemption to labor interests becomes strong. For instance, it
would be highly questionable to provide tax exemption to business and
not to labor. Because business interests are generally able to overcome
the collective action problem with greater ease and have an
overwhelming superiority in political representation in fact, a subsidy
available to business and not labor would appear deeply unjust from a
political fairness perspective.
It would exacerbate political voice
inequality. Thus, where business interests are provided tax exemption,
we must provide the same right to labor.
Again, as in the prior case, it is hard to imagine an argument
prohibiting the deduction of labor union dues. Where other interests may
deduct such amounts, the case for allowing the deduction of labor union
dues would seem inescapable. Doing otherwise would seem to be
democratically suspect.
If you conclude that the logic of the above two paragraphs holds,
then you might also conclude that the system as structured remains
unjust; because of greater wealth and greater ability to organize, business
interests can use the tax exemption subsidy to a much greater extent than
labor.291 Such an unequal subsidy for political representation seems
291 Obviously comparing only labor against business interests is a simplistic analysis. We
would need to throw in all sorts of other issues in order to have a full sense of justice. However,
the choices made in the Code are almost always some sort of rough justice, and comparing labor
to business provides us a simplistic way at getting to this rough justice.
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antithetical to a balanced democracy. Additionally, when the limited
deductability of union dues is considered in light of the fact that business
interests are able to deduct their comparable payments to trade
associations, current tax policy seems problematic.
Thus, if other interests receive tax exemption and deductibility of
interest group dues, labor unions should receive the same treatment. This
case may even provide a justification for prohibiting the deduction of
business interest dues, along with any other interest that does not
experience significant collective action challenges. We already deny the
deduction of political contributions and explicit lobbying payments.292 In a
sense, a denial of business interest group dues could be an extension of
that policy. Notably, a contribution to an interest group formed as a taxexempt social welfare organization is generally non-deductible as well.
Business interests seem to be provided a favorable status for some
reason.
3.

Incentivize Labor Interests While Denying he Incentive to Others

Where other interests are not subsidized through tax exemption and
are unable to deduct interest group dues, how should we treat labor
interests? To simplify this analysis, I compare only the case of business
interests and labor interests. Under this scenario, we could either choose
to deny tax exemption to labor too, or exempt labor alone. We are able
to reasonably consider the taxing labor scenario in full in this simplified
analysis. That is because it treats everyone the same by imposing the
same taxing structure on all interest groups and their members and
potential members. The simplified analysis for incentivizing labor and only
comparing that to business does not give us a complete picture. I hope in
a future article to consider more of the interest group sector in both social
welfare organizations and charitable organizations to more fully consider
this complex analysis. Finally, in each case, I assume we are trying to
increase the social choice function and that we take political fairness in a
democracy sense into consideration of this tax policy because it directly
impacts political voice equality.
If what we want is government neutrality on the matter of tax
exemption, we should tax labor interests when business interests are
taxed. This would mean all income used to support labor and business
interests, whether those interests are organized or remained unorganized,
would face the same tax structure choices currently offered by the
Internal Revenue Code. Such a change would mean either that we treat
292

26 U.S.C.A. § 162(e) (West 2014).
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such organizations as taxable corporations or treat them as cooperatives
taxable under Subchapter T. Those that never organize would simply pay
taxes on income that they might have put towards organizing.
The key to this neo-pluralist case is that it would be a positive
democratic move to treat both interests as taxable rather than taxexempt. On the one hand, the subsidy of tax exemption is given currently
to business interests even though the vast majority of those interests are
well-represented and face little in the way of collective action problems.
They would organize whether there was a subsidy or not. The subsidy to
them is a windfall and those interests are best placed to capture and use
the subsidy. Labor, on the other hand, is not well represented in a political
voice sense, and is little able to make use of the subsidy even when
available. Taxing both interests would place both interests in the same
relative position.
If we implemented such a change, labor unions would likely pay little
to no tax because it likely has little to no earnings. Business interests
would likely pay some tax associated with their activities. Treating
business and labor interests alike in this way would be to treat the two in
a tax neutral matter.
The neutral policy on dues would likely be to deny the dues
deduction to labor interests when business interests are denied the
deduction. Anyone engaging in interest group activity would bear tax on
their individual or entity level tax they otherwise would owe. As it stands,
the current policy primarily supports the interest of businessmen. As
noted above, Congress already treats political campaign expenditures and
lobbying expenditures as non-deductible personal ones. There is no
reason we could not extend that notion into this very similar realm. Given
that most laborers are unable to take this deduction anyway, this do little
to no harm to the labor union movement. It would also move the
government to a more neutral stance by not incentivizing the business
association interests over that of labor as currently happens.
The more difficult question in a justice sense is whether to provide
labor interests tax exemption and allow labor union members the ability
to deduct union dues while denying the same to business interests.
Although the subsidy for labor unions through tax exemption is
neither great in amount nor well-tailored, even marginal improvements in
the labor interest representation should enhance our democracy because
it would likely increase the social choice function. If the modest subsidy
administered in the absence of a business interest subsidy results in even
a couple extra unions representing some group of laborers we would likely
have more individuals with a seat at the table for agenda-setting and
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decision-making. Still, denying the deduction to business interests would
likely lead to fewer business interests obtaining representation as well,
which would result in some lessening of the social choice function. How
do we reconcile that?
While it seems difficult to compare the results of this change in
policy, given the relative collective action problems of the two different
groups, it seems likely that business interests would still be more generally
represented before federal, state and local governments than labor
interests even after losing tax exemption. Studies of the impact of
removing exemption could be useful. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable
to conclude that labor interests are so hampered, while business interests
are so advantaged in comparison, that it is likely that providing the subsidy
to labor and not business would be social choice function enhancing.
Thus, I argue, we could legitimately maintain tax exemption for labor
interests in this case. For the reasons set forth though in Part VI B 1
though, the case is not a strong one. There are many interests who will
never obtain the benefit of the subsidy.
A stronger case can be made for allowing employees to deduct labor
union dues above the line while simultaneously denying that right to
business association members. Allowing a deduction for labor union dues
would be targeted exactly to encourage membership in a union. This
means this deduction would be tailored to the choice of an employee to
join and stay in a labor union. Providing this subsidy while denying it to
business interests could again increase the social choice function,
although still with the caveats listed above. Still, providing the deduction
to labor would not reach the interests that never organize and this creates
its own political voice equality problems.
If someone were still inclined to try to utilize the exemption and the
deduction to enhance the social choice function, there is still one other
area to at least consider. Can we constitutionally limit—or equalize—
interest group expenditures through the tax system to limit the power of
wealthy voices—or equalize the voices of everyone else? 293 As noted in
Part III, while the fundamental rights (freedom of speech, free and fair
elections) of a polyarchy are there to make political voice equality
possible, they do not work to make it a reality. While our Constitution
promises one person, one vote, and ensures freedom of speech and
association, it does not explicitly speak to establishing a system to provide
political voice equality. This is the debate we see in campaign finance.
293

RICHARD L. HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED 74–89 (2016); LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC LOST 58–70
(2016) (considering this question with respect to campaign contributions within campaign
finance law).
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Those who advocate for campaign finance regulations often point out the
harmful effect of wealth on our democracy because it makes wealthy
individuals’ voices so much more powerful than every day Americans.
With that said, the Supreme Court does not recognize equality as a
rationale for imposing campaign finance limitations. 294
In Buckley v. Valeo the Court stated:
[T]he concept that the government may restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is
wholly foreign to the First Amendment, which was designed to secure
the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources and to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for
the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people.295

Whether this opinion and its progeny puts a roadblock on how the
tax system is used to subsidize certain interests is an important question
that needs examination. I provide here only my initial thoughts.
The lesson of collective action theory and the empirical work on
interest group structure is that not all interests are created equally.
Neutrality as to these matters means that some interests will necessarily
have a much louder voice at the table of government than others. Many
will have no voice at all. The attitude of the Buckley Court on the First
Amendment may very well be the intent of the Framers, but it fails
miserably as a matter of achieving a stronger democracy and justice. 296
How does this opinion impact deductions and exemptions from tax?
The Court’s use of the limits on equality principle as a justification
seem to be focused on provisions that either limit campaign expenditures
or limit campaign contributions. Providing a deduction or not, and
providing tax exemption or not, has not been seen by the Court as the
type of limitation that campaign finance applies. In Cammarano v. United
States, the Court found that denying a deduction for lobbying expenses
harmed no First Amendment interest.297 Furthermore, in examining the
question of whether a charitable organization could be limited in its ability
to lobby, the Court in Regan v. Taxation with Representation again found
no First Amendment interest violated by limiting tax exemption based on
294

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976).
Id. at 48–49 (internal quotation marks omitted).
296 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 360 (expanded ed. 2005) (“The Court fails to
recognize the essential point that the fair value of the political liberties is required for a just
political procedure, and that to insure their fair value it is necessary to prevent those with
greater property and wealth, and the greater skills of organization which accompany them, from
controlling the electoral process to their advantage.”).
297 Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 512–13 (1959).
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the activity of lobbying.298 The Court held that there was no equal
protection issue in subsidizing one interest more than another, such as
when Congress grants the benefit of accepting tax deductible charitable
contributions to veterans organizations, but not to social welfare
organizations.299 Thus, it appears that the Court has thus far willingly
allowed tax exemption and tax deductions to be established with political
activity in mind.
This suggests that if Congress chooses to treat all interests equally, it
can. If it wants to subsidize some activity more than another, it can do
that too. It seems like the most difficult issue is whether it could subsidize
some interest greater than another. 300 In other words, could it
legitimately choose to subsidize labor more than business interests, or
vice versa. Justice and democracy demand that Congress be allowed to
give a helping hand to interests that face great challenges in projecting
their voice in our democracy. I leave for another time whether the
Constitution permits that choice. However, Congress has at its disposal
the ability to make a political voice equality enhancing move by removing
tax exemption from labor and business and by taxing the dues of both
labor and interest. Another possible social choice function enhancing
move would be to provide labor union members a deduction above the
line for union dues to equalize the treatment of business and labor
interests that are now out of balance in favor of business interests.
CONCLUSION
Although the focus of this Article is on one small sector of the tax
world, laborers as an interest group, it uses that sector to argue we should
consider political fairness as a factor in tax policy. It demonstrates that
current policy on tax exemption likely harms social choice function by
enhancing the voice of business and diminishing the voice of labor.
Although traditionally we examine tax policy by considering its economic
fairness and efficiency, I argue we should consider the value of political
fairness when a tax policy directly implicates political voice. In the case of
labor union activity the tax policy of tax exemption and the deduction of
union dues directly impact political voice.
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Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 61 U.S. 540, 545–46 (1983).
Id. at 550–51. See also Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Nonprofits, Speech, and Unconstitutional
Conditions, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1045, 1064, 1071 (2014) (noting that such a distinction is
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A fundamental tenet of this political fairness analysis I propose is that
it focus on a social choice function. I contend that the social choice
function is key in this analysis because our tax policy should be democracy
enhancing rather than democracy detracting. The primary question to ask
therefore is whether a particular policy increases political voice equality.
Current policy on both exemption and the deduction of union dues likely
decreases political voice equality. We should therefore look to change tax
policy towards labor unions.
This Article presents a neo-pluralist justification for the exemption
from income tax provided for interest groups. The original pluralism
justification suggested we should support any and all nonprofit
organizations, no matter the cause, in order to enhance our democracy.
The neo-pluralist justification recognizes the deep impact of the collective
action problem on the interests in our society. In particular, those
interests that are vast in number, poor in wealth, and limited in political
skill are likely to face great difficulty in organizing to represent their
interests before our governments. Conversely, those interests that are
smaller, wealthy, and endowed with political skill are likely to face little
difficulty in organizing to represent their interests. This collective action
problem is a significant hindrance to advancing democracy. Interest
groups are significant representatives of peoples’ interests before our
government. We should not adopt policies that make that democratic
failure worse.
Currently, the Code appears to treat business and labor interests
exactly the same under tax-exemption. Business interests can form
nonprofit tax-exempt organizations to further their interests, and labor
interests and the poor can do the same. However, because of the
problem of collective action this system overwhelmingly helps out the
business interests and leaves the interests of the workingman behind. We
would enhance political voice equality by ending exemption generally for
labor unions and trade associations. Although the case is not strong and is
subject to problems, we could legitimately choose to maintain it for labor.
Additionally, current policy that allows business interests to deduct dues,
but limits labor interests from deducting the same, is unjust and harmful
to our democracy. We should either allow labor union members to
deduct their union dues above the line or prohibit business interests from
deducting these expenses like we do to most labor union members.

